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THE TIME FOR DECISION. By Sumner Welles. New York: Harper & Bros.,
1944. Pp. vii, 431. $3.00.
U. S. WAR AIms. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 19,14.
Pp. viii, 235. $1.50.
WOODROW WILSON AND THE LOST PEACE. By Thomas A. Bailey. New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. viii, 381. $3.00.
THESE three books about recent diplomatic history are part of the great public
debate which will help to settle the immediate controversies of our foreign
policy. Each attempts to draw lessons for the future from what it treats as the
mistakes, and successes, of tl!e last thirty years of our behavior in the inter-
national community. Each is primarily concerned with certain of the large
decisions which the government of the United States will have to make:
whether to help build, and then join, a new League of Nations; whether to
maintain our wartime alliances and associations; and how to treat Germany,
Japan and our other enemies. These are the first questions of our times. Their
resolution will fix the course of our foreign policy for a generation, and estab-
lish the framework within which we can pursue domestic social, political and
economic goals. How they are met will determine the fate of the Republic.
In that sense these are desperately popular books, and it may not be alto-
gather inappropriate for them to be reviewed by a lay reader, rather than a
professional historian.
One striking quality of our thinking about the problems of war and peace
marks all three of these books. To an extraordinary extent, the isstes have
been framed for us by the experience of the last war. In a sense, we have
been reliving the years between 1914 and 1921, Allies and Germans alike.
For some purposes, this has been a useful psychological fact. Fortified with
the thought of history repeating itself, the British did not despair in 1940;
nor did the Germans ever quite escape an uneasy sense of their doom. Even
in the middle of 1942, we never seriously contemplated the possibility of
losing the war. Now, facing the peace, we find that the debate of Wilson and
Lodge, of President Taft and the elder La Follette, is still going on. We are
greatly concerned, perhaps too greatly concerned, with Wilson's tactics and
Wilson's points-his failure to consult the Senate in advance, his offer of a
military alliance to France, the constitutional problem he provoked about the
President's power to use the armed forces, whether the new League should
or should not be part of the Peace Treaty, and so on.
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Wilson was a very great prophet, but a poor negotiator and political leader.
Wilson's eloquence, his religious ardor, his legend, and above all his forceful
and misleading formulation of the issues, are proving on the whole to be a
handicap to serious thinking about the problems of our foreign policy. Wilson
should be taken as the heroic symbol of a basic axiom of our foreign policy,
not the spokesman of a detailed program. The doctrine for which he stands,
broadly speaking, in the public mind todav,--and on this point our people are
now disposed to agree that he was right-is the doctrine that in the modem
world peace is indivisible, and that the United States has a continuing and
responsible national interest in preserving it. This Doctrine should be con-
sidered with the Monroe Doctrine as an enduring cornerstone of our foreign
policy, and it might well become known, by analogy, as the Wilson Doctrine.
Beyond that broad proposition, however, it is unnecessary and even danger-
ous to follow Wilson too closely. Times, forces, and problems have changed.
And even for his own times Wilson was not by any means a leader without
blemish.
The incubus of Wilsonism is the main subject matter of these three books.
Mr. Welles' important tract is in part a memoir of his experience as Under-
Secretary of State, in part a program for the development of a continuous and
consistent American foreign policy. Written with color and passion, it
strongly presents the case for a Wilsonian approach to the problems of peace.
It digresses at some points, notably in its extended treatment of Pan-American
problems, and it pays off some personal and professional scores, with com-
pound interest. But in the main it is an essay on the problems of Versailles,
reviewed and brought up to date in the light of our subsequent experience.
Starting with a balanced and concise analysis of the issues before the 1919
peacemakers, it considers the diplomacy of the period between wars, reports
on Mr. Welles' 1940 mission to Europe, and, in a useful last chapter, lists
the main elements and objectives of an enduring American foreign policy.
Mr. Welles urges an immediate beginning on the task of organizing a new
League, and the creation of our ultimate security arrangements through it.
This association, however, must not "come suddenly into being as a completed
and detailed international charter." It must be rather a gradual growth, based on
experience, and sustained in its earlier period of life by the vigorous continuance
in peacetime of our present alliance for carrying on the war.'
Unlike many commentators on the problem of our security, Mr. Welles
does not evade the essential condition precedent to the success of a new League--
the question of how German territory shall be politically organized. He dis-
misses the casual and superficial plan of restoring the status quo ante 1939.
He strongly supports the policy of undoing the German union of 1871, and
of partitioning Germany into separate states. Through these states the
German people could quickly resume a profitable participation in the political
1. VE.=s, THE TIME FoR DEcisio (1944) 370.
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and economic life of Europe, without constituting a military threat to any-
body. This approach to the German problem offers the United States a
maximum chance for its security during the next fifty years.2 In this and
other important particulars-notably on the maintenance of international
staff arrangements-Mr. Welles differs from Wilson, but the conception of
policy he advocates is Wilsonian in its broadest and best sense.
Mr. Lippmann, the most useful and responsible of our war-time journal-
ists, has written a cogent pamphlet which in many ways complements Mr.
Welles' book. In broad strokes, and with admirable balance and perspective,
Mr. Lippmann sets out the political and strategic factors which twice in this
century have led us to fight for the system of power on which our safety
as a nation depends. From this analysis, he develops a program through which
our foreign policy might well hope to consolidate and secure the peace-a
program of close association with Britain, France and the other nations of
the West, in an "Atlantic Community" which would remain closely linked,
both through direct coalition and through a new League of Nations, with
like regional communities centering in the Soviet Union, China, and ultimately
in the Moslem world. The new League would not have primary responsibility
for keeping the peace. Such a view of the League's functions "will fix the
responsibility where alone it can be discharged-upon the governments of
the great powers and their neighbors with whom they are allied. There will
be no pretense, and no escape by means of the pretense, that the responsibility
for preventing war is anywhere else than where it really is: in the great mili-
tary states themselves." 3 Mr. Lippmann professes to be anti-Wilsonian in
outlook, and his prescription of what should be done to keep the peace pur-
ports to differ profoundly, in procedure at least, from the course of action
proposed by Mr. Welles. When compared in detail, however, the differences
seem illusory. The actual programs of the two men are not tar apart.
Professor Bailey has written a clear, if academic, analysis of what Wilson
did at Paris, with a view to instructing us as to Wilson's errors, and those of
other men. It is a convenient review of what happened, and an interesting
case study in why American youth has been so badly educated on the basic
problems of American security. Careful and workmanlike in detail, the book
never considers, nor even presents, the fundamental system of ideas which
dominates it, and gives it shape. These ideas emerge in asides, and in the
2. It is a paradox that Mr. Lippmann's book, so clear in its perception of the power
foundations of political order, is weak in its prescription for Germany. His program
would leave a vengeful, strong Germany a good fighting chance to divide the Russians
from Britain, France and the United States, and permit Germans again to dream of
achieving the condition of 1939-Russian neutrality during a German war against the west.
One may assume that even German militarism has learned that war in the East cannot pay.
See also HOW To END THi GERMAN MENACE, A POLITICAL PROPOSAL, BY FIVE HOLLANDMS
(1944).
3. LrPPMANN, U. S. Wa Ants (1944) 168-169.
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interstices of the chapters. Together, the asides constitute the most dangerous
of all the Vilson legends: the Ray Stannard Baker thesis, recently revived
by Mr. NVilliam Bullitt and others, that Wilson was forced by "power poli-
tics" in Paris to compromise with his principles, with the result that the
Treaty became an unjust instrument for oppressing Germany, and therefore
"caused" the present war. If Professor Bailey devoted one quarter of the
attention to the fallacies of this thesis that he gives, for example, to the con-
troversies at Versailles over Fiume or Shantung, his book would have been a
great deal more intelligible, and useful.
In essence, all three books grapple with this same general issue, which is
perhaps the worst single aspect of our Wilsonian legacy. The issue is vari-
ously defined as a supposed choice between "power politics" and "idealism,"
between "domination of the Big Four" and "equality for small nations," be-
tween American virtue and European vice. The words and ideas get almost
hopelessly enmeshed with American insularity, smugness and xenophobia.
They become the crocodile tears of our isolationists, who urged us to ignore
the fall of France, and now weep over the fate of Estonia. They provide one
of the last arguments of the isolationists, in the form of the doctrine that we
should be too proud, as we are too pure, to become entangled in the dirty
power politics of the world-a curious and extraordinary idea to prevail among
Americans, whose domestic politics have always been human, not to say earthy,
in their practical compromises and adjustments. It is an extraordinary idea
in another sense as well. The course of world politics has always involved
the United States in general world wars, and presumably always wil. It is
hard to understand how we can be expected to look after our vital national
interest in controlling this phenomenon by ignoring the political events which
govern it.
However, the issue is planted deep in the public mind. Mr. Welles and
Mr. Lippmann, as well as Professor Bailey, have hard words about "power
politics" scattered through their books. The phrase is hard to define, because
the supposed choice between power and other kinds of politics doesn't exist.
Vhat alternative basis is there for political action, short of natural or canonical
law? How can the rules, customs and legal norms which govern the use of
power conceal the fact that power is the final constituent- of social organiza-
tion, and that the main preoccupation of law, municipal and international, is
to control the exercise of authority in ways which fulfill accepted social and
ethical purposes? The uses of power are governed in each caie by the whole
content of the culture in which men assert their authority. However much the
exercise of power is circumscribed by history, courts, elections, or other
mechanisms of control, there is no evading the fact it is power we are talking
about, and power which has the last word. Nothing can alter the fact that
there are large and small states, states with and without military power. Power
is exercised differently by different countries, according to their cultural habits,
just as the ultimate police power within a state is differently used in Switzer-
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land, say, and Roumania, in Georgia and in Vermont. Canada, the small
neighbor of a great power, faces different military risks than Belgium. The
imaginary alternative between power and another basis for political action
is false, and the prevalence of the idea conceals and confuses real issues.
Nonetheless, the idea does exist and must be dealt with. It makes two
main appearances in the books under review: one in considering what was
done at Versailles, the other in discussing how a new League should be or-
ganized at a new Versailles.
What people generally mean when they talk about "power politics" at Ver-
sailles in 1919 is quite specific, and generally speaking quite mistaken. The
phrase is used broadly to characterize the view that Wilson's error at
Versailles was his undue concession to European "pqwer politics," which
chiefly means European fear of renewed German aggression. It assumes that
the enduring weakness of Versailles was the abstract injustice of the settle-
ment with Germany, in violating the principle of self-determination, rather
than our failure to build on, enforce and modify the settlement in the light
of events. As Mr. Lippmann points out, it is a great mystery why Americans
feel so deeply about self-determination in Europe, since we fought a bloody
war, and imposed a harsh and punitive peace after it, to stamp out the doc-
trine among ourselves. Yet such a view of the Versailles conference is widely
held in this country. It accepts the main argument of twenty years of German
propaganda, and assumes that the "injustices" of Versailles were an important
factor in Hitler's rise to power. It leads to the conclusion that the way to
prevent another Hitler from coming along is for us once more to fight bit-
terly with our Allies at the peace conference, as Germany's advocate, to obtain
a soft peace. Mr. Welles, though he repudiates this tendency at one point,4
is not altogether free of the conviction that the chief sinners at Versailles
were British and French, and that we must be on guard~ against their suc-
cessors. Professor Bailey, of course, supports this doctrine with uncritical
faith.
It is one of the greatest merits of Mr. Lippmann's book that he tackles
the myth head on. Looking back, it seems perfectly plain that what turned
out to be the disastrous difficulties of Versailles were not Wilson's conces-
sions to Clemencedu, but Clemenceau's concessions to Wilson. The size of
the reparations bill, which Professor Bailey calls the greatest of Wilson's
errors, proved to be a nuisance, and caused bitter hard feeling among the
Allies, since Wilson and his successors refused to link the war debts' ques-
tion to that of reparations. But Germany received four times as much in
loans as she ever paid in reparations-and then defaulted on the loans. In
any event, reparations were abolished for good in 1930, three years before
Hitler came to power. They can hardly count as a substantial cause of Hitler-
ism and the war, except in helping to weaken the coalition which might have
prevented war.
4. W=W.s, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11, 17.
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No, the 1919 decisions which turned out to be catastrophic were quite
different: our failure to support some form of international military staff
organization; our failure to ratify the treaty of alliance with France, with
which Wilson horn-swoggled Clemenceau out of a Rhenish republic; our
resistance to all serious proposals for partitioning Germany, or even en-
couraging German separatism in Bavaria and elsewhere. Nothing is more
striking in the literature about the peace than reiterated British and American
complaints about the tiresome and long-winded French delegates. Poor
Frenchmen l They went on and on, with their orderly speeches and their
eloquent perorations, because they knev they were right, and knew that they
were not persuading their Allies. They thought we would see the point if ex-
posed to enough logic., Fortunately or unfortunately, logic is not the life of
our foreign policy. Bonsal's rueful note is the best comment on the phenome-
non: ... "whenever the French plan of putting force behind the League was
projected into the discussions it was warmly, if but briefly, supported by
Dmowski (Poland), Vesnitch (Serbia), Kramfir (Czechoslovakia), and Hy-
mans (Belgium) .... When the meager sop of consolation (Article IX)
was handed out Dmowski said sadly: 'I had hoped that our distinguished
and most welcome visitors from across the seas, broad as well as narrow,
would carefully weigh the unanimous opinion of those unfortunate peoples
who dwell so near the cave where the wolf pack lowers." Bonsal appends this
footnote: "It is sad to admit that these five countries were the first to suffer
from the failure of the conference to take the precautionary measures which
they so repeatedly advocated." r
Beyond the detailed issues of the 1919 Peace Conference, however, there
is a general proposition, put by Professor Bailey in this form: "There are
two ways of dealing with a fallen foe. The one is to make a peace so generous
that he may forgive and forget. Whether Germany would have responded
favorably to such treatment is still a matter of speculation, but there was a
possibility that it might have worked. The second method is to impose a
victor's peace, with the purpose of keeping the conqueror's heel on the enemy's
neck as long as physically possible. This method is certain to breed aonther
war." 6 Apart from its extraordinary suggestion that we owed Germany an
apology for winning the last war, the notion is so unhistorical, so contrary to
common sense, and so plausible as to deserve special comment. The early
annexations of Prussia, including those ratified in the victor's peace of 1871,
did not give rise to wars of revenge. The French in 1914 mourned Alsace
and Lorraine, but hadn't the faintest idea of risking war with the German
army to retake them. So do the Danes regret Schleswig-Holstein, and so did
the France of the Bourbon restoration look back nostalgically at Belgium.
The settlement of 1865 in the United States was harsh and was resented, but
it has prevented a renewal of civil war, and in all probability has buried the
5. BoxsAr., UNxFn'isHE_ Busn-,ss (1944) 188 and n. 9.
6. BA=LEY, XVooDmOW WVISON AND THE LoSr PFcA (1944) 312-313.
1944]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
secession issue in the United States forever. This was not a foreordained
result, for secessionism and self-determination had flourished in New England
and elsewhere in many forms before 1865. We might well have taken the
uneasy and unstable course, now accepted by the British, of trying to build a
constitution on the principle of voluntary association. The harsh peace of
1865 has worked, as have other harsh as well as mild peace arrangements,
when circumstances of power and interest favored peace. The resentment
of the Germans against Versailles was one of the latent forces in German
life which Hitler exploited, when the depression and the social disorganization
of Germany after 1929 gave him his opportunity. That resentment, however,
had very little to do with the merits or demerits of the Treaty itself. It was
the consequence of defeat, which can be studied in our South, among the
Boers of South Africa, the Hungarians, and many other peoples. The same
spirit will exist in Germany for several generations after this war, whether
the new peace be mild or harsh. Defeat is a traumatic experience with painful
consequences, especially for Germans.
The second area in which we are much confused with talk of power politics
is that of plans for the organization of a new League. How can we reconcile
the principle of the sovereign equality of nations with the fact that states are
not equal in power, and that great wars are the affair of great powers, not
little ones? Shall we use the rule of unanimity in large decisions, or a simple
majority, or the rule of unanimity among the great powers alone? Shall the
keeping of the peace be a function of the new League, or of the great Powers
through a committee of the League, or of the great Powers apart from the
League? Certainly the rule of unanimity was one of the profound weaknesses
of the old League, paralyzing its capacity to act. Yet, just as certainly there
seems to be something undemocratic or even dictatorial about an arrangement
which doesn't give each sovereign nation a voice, and a vote, in the important
affairs of community life.
It is on this series of issues that Mr. Welles and Mr. Lippmann seem to
be furthest apart, and actually are closest together. Both men agree that re-
gional systems exist, and should be accepted in some form within the frame-
work of a general system of security. Regional systems will permit the
solution of most conflicts by the neighbors, large and small, directly concerned.
Mr. Welles says that the new League must have responsibiliy for keeping the
peace. Mr. Lippmann says it should be concerned in the first instance with
the important order of international problems not directly concerned with
maintaining the peace-with colonial problems, the advance of science, tech-
nology, labor standards, and the like. In his view, keeping the peace is for
some time-perhaps a generation-the primary responsibility of the great
powers. But Mr. Welles concedes that "the four major powers primarily
responsible for winning the war and for preventing renewed outbreaks after
the armistice must necessarily assume the basic responsibility for making and
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carrying out all military decisions." - He proposes that they should create a
Provisional United Nations Executive Council of eleven, which could act
only on a two-thirds vote, including the votes of all four great powers. This
council would be a first step towards reconciling two basic problems-the
need of the great powers for freedom of military action, and the need for
giving full representation and protection to the smaller powers. Mr. Lipp-
mann says what Mr. Welles is too much a Wilsonian to emphasize, although
in effect he admits it: that for some time, perhaps a long time to come, keeping
the peace, like fighting the war, will be the job primarily of the great military
powers. Only the diplomacy and good sense of the great powers can prevent
Germany or Japan, or a new aggressor, from gaining military freedom by
playing the Allies against each other. "The organized power which wins the
war must be used to win the peace. It can bring to an end the frightful wars
of our age. If it cannot, then nothing can, certainly not some pale, thin,
abstract, generalized blueprint of a mechanism." 8 The new League, in Mr.
Lippmann's view, should build its strength and influence as an instrument of
consultation and conciliation, first on the essentially non-political issues, later
as its powers may grow with success. "We have to reverse the Wilsonian pat-
term of collective security. We cannot build a universal society from the top
downwards. We must build up to it from the existing national states and
historic communities. That, I think, is what we must learn from the great
experiment at Geneva and from its failure. We have, I am convinced, to learn
it thoroughly. For we cannot afford to fail again." o
Mr. Welles' view is not substantially different:
"I have long felt that a major reason for the failure of the League
was the fact that the Covenant came suddenly into being as a com-
pleted and detailed international charter. It was not a carrying-over
into the time of peace of the alliance which had been created during
the war. It did not grow gradually as a result of actual experience.
Furthermore, because the Covenant came full-grown into being, peo-
ples everywhere were apt to persuade themselves that a final and
real peace already existed. It was impossible for their governments
to arouse them to the truth that the Covenant was but paper, and
would remain so unless each of the major powers was willing to use,
if necessary, sufficient armed strength to carry out the provisions
both of the Covenant and of the peace treat
, 
itself, especially during
the first turbulent postwar years.
"After this war a wholly different approach seems indispensable.
It is essential that, before the war ends, the United Nations agree
to a transition period to follow the surrender of their enemies. Its
length would be fixed later by common agreement and would depend
on their progress in laying the foundations for a world of peace.
7 WELLES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 372.
8. LiPp MxN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 164-165.
9. Ibid. at 195.
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During this transition period the United Nations would have a chance
to complete the first and most urgent military steps required; to cor-
rect the cardinal territorial errors of the past; to carry out such
transfers of populations as may be necessary; to conclude the more
immediate programs for rehabilitation and reconstruction; and to
pave the way for their ultimate assumption of international trustee-
ship ov-r such dependent peoples as are not yet ready to enjoy the
rights of self-government. During this period, as the hatreds and
bitternesse§ engendered by the war years gradually burn themselves
out, the United Nations can, little by little, determine the specific
machinery needed for a permanent and effective international organ-
ization." 10
Only by facing these facts can we progress towards a system of security in
which the luxuries of demobilization, trade, and social progress can be pur-
sued. Slogans about "power politics" and "dictatorship of the great powers"
only divert attention from the fact that there are great powers, which must
meet their responsibility for peace by using their power. Power must be
used wisely, in concert, and after consultation with all concerned; but it must
be used, or the peace will turn into an uneasy armistice. If our close associa-
tion with the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, France and Chinai is
maintained after the war, as an enduring and living reality, spreading from
the military realm to the realms of commerce, cultural interchange, and human
association, then the constitutional problems of League-making will be easy
matters of draftsmanship and detail. It will not be easy to maintain the
alliance. As in 1919, strong forces are at work, playing on irrational and
ideological prejudices, to' divide the Allies. It will take energy, imagination
and statesmanship of a high order to preserve the concert of the Powers.
That concert can be preserved, for there are no conflicts of actual interest
among the Allies which cannot be peacefully harmonized. All have a common
stake in the restoration and maintenance of peace, and in the establishment
of effective peaceful methods for reconciling and settling international dis-
putes. In reorganizing the system of world power after the collapse of Ger-
many, ticklish political issues will arise, as was the case after the collapse
and partitioning of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires earlier in this
century. It will necessarily be difficult to resolve these and the other basic
political and economic 'problems of the world community through the pro-
cedure of agreed action. Without that procedure, however, solution would
be impossible. Unless a real coalition of the great powers is maintained, as
the nucleus of a larger association of nations, League-making will be an empty
and sterile exercise, as it was in 1919, and there will be no peace.
EUGENE V. Rosrow t
10. WVELiEs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 370-371.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
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THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION. By Karl Polanyi. New York: Farrar and
Reinhart, Inc., 1944. Pp. xiv, 305. $3.00.
ENGLAND'S SERVICE. By "Sarpedon." London: Macmillan & Co., 1942. Pp.
v, 176. 6s.
BUREAuRAcY. By Ludwig von Mises. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1944. Pp. viii, 125. $2.00.
THE ROAD TO SzFsDom. By Friedrich A. Hayek. London: George Routledge
& Sons, Ltd. 1944. Pp. viii, 184. 10s. 6d.
As we move towards a new social order, a stream of books attests the vio-
lence of the transition. In the human-as well as the natural sciences-treatise,
excursion, broadside is dated. Amid the flood of ephemera which reviewers
mistake for durable literary wares, there appear now and then volumes which
have meaning for tomorrow. None of these tracts of the times can escape the
heated emotional climate in which it is produced; but a small number, how-
ever confused the groping, are sincerely concerned to discover the drive, in
order that direction may be given, to the course of events. And if a babble of
voices, rather than a chorus, marks them as true to their age, they are aids, if
not to a clear, at least to a less dim, vision.
A host of volumes tells of countries, movements, incidents; it records phe-
nomena which reveal the age. As large a multitude is concerned with nations,
frontiers, mandates, police; they reveal the ingredients out of which the next
war is likely to be fashioned. And as many more explain in print how we
can get back to where we were before all that was good and established was
upset; they expose the state of mind within which we must effect the best
truce we can with the tumultuous forces of change. Amidst a deluge of com-
ment, such as no crisis in history has ever before produced, the seminal books
stand out sharply.
In all this literature-even in the few writings which excite and provoke--
there is a harking back. At all periods of crisis, it is the habit of man to look
back to a Garden of Eden, the Golden Age, the good old days. As a variation, our
generation puts, not a normalcy of perfection, but one that-all-things-considered-
will-do only a few decades back. And it asks, not in dreamy but in practical
terms, how the nineteenth century managed it as well as it did. Against this
period of violence, "the hundred years peace" from Waterloo to Sarajevo stands
out as a lull in secular history. About this problem four men, each conspicuous
in his own way among the many who have tackled it, have something to say.
Of these, two are Austrians, one a Hungarian, and one an Englishman of Dutch
birth and nationality. All four are concerned with what was and where we
should go from here. Two of them want to know how we got that way and
insist upon knowing where in time here is.
Among the four, the Austrians are most easily put aside. Reviewers have
called "the message" of von 'Mises and Hayek a voice from the grave-and
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not without good cause. For each finds the key to peace, to progress, and to
such prosperity as a little while ago lay upon the surface of things in the separa-
tion of state and economy. Each pleads for a return to the Age of Contract,
in which a free market was the dominant agency of control and Sir Henry
Maine, Anson of contracts fame, and the classical economists were certified
major prophets. Granted their premises-which most of us would never do-
their arguments are well thought out, deftly rather than soundly reasoned,
somewhat aloof from the realities of this world, and elevated to the pinnacle
of minor works of art by virtue of unity of structure and a kind of self-con-
tained logic. But the free market they seek to restore never was; so far as it
existed, it operated within an institutional pattern; against the currents which
move towards collectivism-whether of left or right-it is no more than an
utopian dream.
Yet the two books have a place which their critics have failed to accord
them. Their vice is a lack of perspective. Neither author is a genetic historian;
each attempts, as Charles Cooley once put it, to tell time by the second hand
of the watch. A friendly, if somewhat out-of-date, reviewer remarked the
other day that it was strange that the two men, who today stand most directly
in the tradition of Adam Smith and the Manchester School are Austrians.
The relation can not pass without challenge; for Adam Smith reflects his own
state of society; and so do Hayek and von Mises-but a very different one.
And there is nothing strange to explain; for their views, whatever use they have
made of classical economic theory, derive from the contemporary scene. Aus-
•trians, as almost no other people, have of late been beaten upon by all the ex-
treme measures which government as lord of the economy has to offer. They
do no more than share in an exaggerated form the distrust of the English
Utilitarians for the state in the role of regulator of trade. And each, using a
technical equipment which within its narrow limits is quite competent, has
given literary play to his own emotions. As a result the two books are superb
historical documents, polemical phenomena thrown out by a great cultural up-
heaval. Although neither is able to diagnose, much less to prescribe for, the
lapse of a culture from what it was thought to be, each indicates the move
towards the union of state *and economy-for which in thought we are quite
unprepared-as the dominant problem of our time.
The other two, a Hungarian and an English-alien,'possess what the Aus-
trians lack-a sense of time and a feel for the social process. Whereas the
,free market is to the Austrians the order of nature, save that men may cor-
rupt it, it is to "Sarpendon" and to I olanyi a historical fact. Polanyi stresses
the dominance of the market economy as a brief and strange event in the
annals of mankind; Sarpedon makes it a result of England's conscious policy,
shrewdly conceived and brilliantly executed. Each concurs, at least for the
nineteenth century, in the result reached by the Austrians; the separation of
state and economy was good; even more, it was essential within the conditions
then prevailing. The two differ from the Austrians in insisting, not that the
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free market maintained industrial order, but that the absence of the state left
the economy to bZ operated by agencies and through techniques shaped to
the requirements of the task. Again, like the Austrians, Polanyi and Sarpedon
demand a separation of state and economy; and, unlike them, decry a return to
the free market as the instrument of reform. In its stead they put the case
for the politics of industry, though they do not agree upon what sort of an
economic state it should be. We must have questions before we can contrive
answers; and the differences between them-as well as from the Austrians---
touch off a lively docket.
Polanyi is fascinated by that curious historical phenomenon "a free mar-
ket." He recites the detail of how it was established, first in England, then on
the Continent and overseas. He insists that "the urge to truck and barter"
is not natural to man; that for centuries the market was a mere mechanism in
England's economic pattern; that a scheme of long run relations involving
trust and confidence left to contract a minor role; that regulation was tradi-
tional and competition an innovation; that local protection fell before an im-
personal national industry; and that human and social values were at last made
mere incidents to the process of buying and selling. In a word life, culture,
society became a by-product of the practice of the acquisitive arts. Yet the
market economy was not a natural development. The exchange of wares de-
manded elaborate rules of the game and the operation of the pecuniary cal-
culus is pent in by severe limits. The whole structure of English society had
to undergo change before land could be brought to market. rhe operation of
the new institution was impeded for decades because the law made labor im-
mobile. It was only with the invention of the myth that labor is a commodity
that the working class was brought into the new regime. Land and labor were
not caught up into the market economy; instead, as much of the properties
of matter and the capacities of human beings as were caught up were called
land and labor. However important things of culture might be, they came to
signify only as they embodied measurable values. Only by the grace of a ;et
of fictions which did violence to reality was the system able to carry on.
In strokes far more blunt and direct Sarpedon moves to a kindred result.
He glories where Polanyi distrusts; he insists that the new system did exactly
what it promised to do-it made England a rich country. He wants it under-
stood thaf separation of state and economy did not mean laissez-faire. To
him the free market was the mechanism, never the doinant agency, of busines
control. If the Victorians kept the state from interfering in matters which
were not its concern, they were not foolish enough to believe that the economy
could run itself. That office of supervision belonged to England. And, by
England is meant, not the British Empire, or Whitehall or Westminster, but
London, or quite specifically its money-market. Fr credit was needed to
produce and to move goods; an institution of finance, ramifying throughout
the world, determined who was to have credit; the money barons did not lay
out their pounds stirling just to keep a free market gning-in order that it
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might perform a noble social function. Instead they sought security; frowned
apon reckless risk-taking; saw to it that output, capacity to-produce, progress
did not get out of hand. Accordingly capital-that is, business expansion-had
to meet standards rigidly prescribed from London. The money lords severely
fixed the limits within which the free economy was to be trusted.
So long as the economy remained independent, the dangers in nationalism
lay dormant. If industry was not bound by them it did not matter how many
states there were or how large or small they might be. Sarpedon points to the
non-national mindedness of the bankers; Polanyi comments at length upon
the manner in which political frontiers were sterilized. Sarpedon makes im-
portant a medium of credit good anywhere; Polanyi stresses the function of the
gold standard. It was not the tie between money and gold which counted; it
was rather the devise contrived to put currencies beyond the control of the
political state. Sarpedon makes British dominion a secondary matter; if no
obstacle was imposed to the rule of Threadneedle Street, it was better not to
push the flag. The two concur in the significance of a vast free-trade area, in
which all mercantile values had their ultimate reference in the pound stirling.
God save the noble pound, God save the sovereign pound, was the hymn of
peace throughout the economy.
In a world so organized, we are told, the peace was easily kept. The bankers
might make loans-even to both sides-for petty wars. For profit lay in hos-
tilities on a small scale, and Whitehall was there to see to it that small coun-
tries paid their debts. But the same international financiers insisted that some
process other than war be used to straighten out quarrels between the great
powers. For war would put in peril the national credit, the gold standard,
the wide trading area, all the institutions upon which the separation of the
industrial from the political order rested. The state was to maintain law
and order, a task it was fitted to do. An economy, operating from the City
as focus, was to insure peace, security, and an ordained progress.
Thus an order of society at which only yesterday we used to scoff has by
Sarpedon been turned into an earthly paradise. It was no devil, Karl Marx,
or beguiling ideology which corrupted such an Eden into the more primitive
world we know. Polanyi stresses the internal, Sarpedon the external, fac-
tors which brought about institutional decay; but the two agree that the market
economy helped mightily in its own undoing. To Polyani the dominant fact
has been the unwillingness of all interests to leave matters of great concern
'to the arbitrament of an impersonal mechanism. Men of affairs have sought
protection against cut-throat competition; the intellectuals have rebelled at
the exposure of human values to purchase and sale; the workers have sought
security against forces robbing them of skill and jobs. The regulated com-
petition which has resulted is not the competition of each for himself and
the devil take the hindmost. And a competition which has to be "enforced"
by resort to antitrust laws and litigation, is not the free and open competition
of the classical saints.
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In contrast and as complement Sarpedon comments upon what has hap-
pened to the world market. For him affairs got out of hand at Sarajevo. The
money lords, who could think pecuniary symbols but not things, were sure
the First World War could last only a few months; its scale of operations
would bankrupt all the participating nations. They were wrong; but govern-
ments stood the strain by the creation of huge public debts, which eventually
brought money under public control. For a time an attempt was made to
behave as if nothing had happened; but almost at once international trade
exhibited signs of distress; money was nationalized; countries, large and small,
were eventually compelled to go off gold. Then, for want of a standard of
values, the world market shrank. The state, usurping a dominant economic
role, went autarkic. The world-wide industrial order was no more; economies
were cut to the size of national realms; governments were forced to play out
of character; the whole fabric of society was torn.
Brilliant as they are, the two accounts fall short of complete diagnosis
Polanyi is detailed in respect to the creation of public controls; he all but
ignores the counter movement by which the controls were taken over by the
parties they were meant to control. Sarpedon is concrete as he recites the
steps towards national autarchy; he tells little of the moves by which the busi-
ness community made its adjustments. He sees clearly the barriers to the
movements of goods; he does not mention the huge volume of traffic in legal
documents-the import and export of contractual obligations; the commerce
in equities in technology, trade-marks, trade names; the de-nationalization
of the business executive; the creation of industrial imperia in which political
frontiers became boundary lines between marketing demesnes. And, in fact,
the framework within which economic trends were given play receives scant
recognition. Here is a revolution which has marked a growth of status under
the forms of contract; given an intricate ubiquity to that ghostly person called
the corporation; defined rights of property in the market, where according to
the law there can be none. In a word, the books supply raw material to the
legal mill, rather than intelligence processed to the needs of the craft. More-
over, the two accounts describe the cases of Great Britain and Western
Europe;'they demand radical amendment to fit the cases of Russia and of the
American republic.
And, like other tracts thrown out by these strange times, they are more
useful in diagnosis than for prescription. Thought of the state as ruler of the
economy frightens Sarpedon; a realization that the state is not yet ready for
such a role causes Polanyi to pause. To Sarpedon, the world is going to be
grimmer than before; and, in a choice between evils, he accepts the cartel as the
price of peace. The closed corporate estate may sacrifice invention to security,
maintain the price-structure by the creation of scarcity, turn every industry
into a dosed club of the elect. But such evils are far preferable to allowing
great nations to make their economies the plaything of power politics. So
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salvation is to come by making London the sovereign of a world economy made
up of rationalized industries, each organized in disregard of frontiers.
A constructive plan, to match his superb analysis, Polanyi lacks. He in-
sists that, however dear the freedoms of speech, press and worship are to us
intellectuals, the real freedom which was an operative fact under the ancient
regime was freedom of contract. But, as contract has gone unilateral and the
state has broken in on the bargain, that freedom has gone. Whether it rests
upon a scaring faith or a grudging acceptance, he puts it down that collectivism
-whether of the left or the right-is here to stay. Men must, then, find a new
sort of freedom within the limits of a controlled economy and an intricate
culture. He would retain the market as a mechanism for the exchange of
goods but take from it the office of regulating values. To him the economy,
like the legal system, is an instrument which must serve objectives which it
does not itself set. Vision and program must direct worldy goods to worthy
human ends. How all of this is to be done it is impossible to report. For at this
point narrative fades into dialectic and the reviewer is unable to follow him
into the upper ether.
But to say that Sarpedon and Polanyi fail to discover the future is not to
disparage their contribution to an understanding of the here and now. Their
inquiries into the past have helped to reveal trends, to sharpen perspective, to
state questions. Myopia is one of the greatest of war's products; the current
struggle generates its own intellectual climate and creates the illusion that in
all matters of social conflict the opposing values stand upon opposite sides of
the military front. Such a vision may purify faith and rob the cause of
doubts; it is, however, a little too precious for the spotted actuality of our
times. The Polanyi chapter on its rise and spread makes it clear that the trend
towards an authoritarian political order is limited to no country, culture or
creed. It may-it has to-bear the idiom of its nation; but its roots lie in
an unhealthy.social situation and it springs violently into being at the break-
down of the market economy. Its devotees may wear shirts of black, brown
or silver; it sports its Kingfishes as well as its Duces. It may lie dormant for
years, so long as the prevailing system delivers its minimum of goods; no
parade of high resolves and sound arguments is going to stop it when people
discover that the institution in which they have put their trust has betrayed
them. The chances are somewhat against it, but "it can happen here." The
current war, with its mutations which have come too fast for apologetics to
follow, is itself symbolic of a social and cultural breakdown.
The course of human events has never known a plan; at no time of transi-
tion have people been able to see at all clearly what was, much less what lay
ahead. Change comes in the instance and by stealth; a structure takes on form
before its outline is clearly apparent. At the moment we seek to suppress
symptoms, when we should probe to the very seat of current disorder. Wit-
ness the proposal of Henry Morgenthau to ruralize an industrial Germany.
He seeks to take away the instrument rather than to correct its use. His is the
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logic which would destroy a printing-press because it can be employed to turn
out obscene literature. The proposal is the more insidious because it repre-
sents the kind of thing we profess to be fighting against; to combat the author-
itarian state by resort to its own weapons is to confess defeat. To the enemy
the destruction of Germany may be a small price to pay, if the cause for
which it stands can be made to triumph. Although the plan has been repudi-
ated, it is to be noted as evidence of a state of mind which bids fair to rob
the war of its capacity for constructive achievement. It threatens, with its
talk of "war guilt, .... war criminals," "punitive measures," to divert into a
sadistic orgy the pent-up emotions whose proper outlet is radical reform. War
is surgery; resort to it can be justified only if the fighting edge is driven to the
deep seat of the malady.
We confront, then, the problem which Sarpedon and Polanyi have laid bare.
The end of the separation of state and economy has brought a crisis to world
culture. If the state is to dominate the economy, the small states will, through
the very pettiness of their industrial systems, be doomed to a low standard of
life; and the large states will use their economies as instruments in a bigger
game of power politics. If the present economy is to dominate the state, the
trend will be towards a regime of financial security realized in a united front
of cartels. In either case, the dynamic urge and the public responsibility which
makes for opportunity, abundance, the release of the creative faculties will be
put in jeopardy. It is probably too late-even if it were desirable-to restore
the market as supreme governor of the affairs of humanity.
We are not prepared to resolve the dilemma by merging state and economy
into an over-all Leviathan as the Russians have done. The task, then, is to
devise an order, techniques, processes, by which current society can rid itself
of its capacity for explosion. Only time, with a lot of human help, will be
able to clear up the confusion. But the road along which answers are to be
found is not without sign-posts. The industrial system must again be made
the instrument of the commonwealth; the economy, reaching across frontiers.
must somehow be put out of the reach of power politics; agencies of control
must be shaped to the dear-cut task each is given to do. If a lost international
order is to be recaptured, a concert of powers to keep the peace is not enough;
the authority which makes war must be stripped of its right to command the
economy. It may take a Third World War, with a real ideologoical conflict, to
expose and to resolve the basic problem. If it is to be averted, there must be
clearer thought and bolder action than are now in prospect. If these fail us.
it will presently be too late to seek an escape from the maladjustment in which
we are caught by resort to political process.
WALTON H. HAM ILTON t
t Soutbmyd Professor of Lawr, Yale Law School.
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FEDERAL CORPORATION ACT. Preliminary Draft Prepared by the Corporation
Law Committee of the American Bar Association. 1944. Pp. 80.
THE Corporation Law Committee of the American Bar Association has
recently completed a preliminary draft of a Federal Corporation Act. The act
is designed to apply to business corporations only. In appraising it, one should
begin by asking what the objectives of a business corporation act are or should
be. Such an act is, first of all, an enabling act, since our theory of corpora-
tions makes it necessary that corporations obtain legislative sanction not only
for their existence but for their exercise of corporate powers. Secondly, a
business corporation act aims to restrict and regulate as well as to enable,
Every business association necessarily has legal relations with a variety of
groups, including its employees, customers, creditors and shareholders. Inas-
much as its relations with employees and customers are little, if at all, affected by
the fact that the association has assumed a corporate form, legislative regula-
tion of those relations is ordinarily embodied in statutes other than business
corporation acts. The same is true to some extent of the relations between a
corporation and its creditors, although the peculiar privilege of limited lia-
bility necessitates certain safeguards for creditors and certain liabilities to
creditors which are important features of all corporation laws. In fact, the
typical corporation statutes of a century ago-such as the widely copied New
York Manufacturing Corporations Act of 1848-were so drafted as to indi-
cate that, insofar as the legislature was seeking to protect rather than to
authorize and enable, it was primarily corporate creditors whose protection
was being attempted. Shareholders, unlike creditors, have votes. They, or
at any rate a majority of them, can in theory depose any director or officer
whose performance of his managerial functions fails to measure up to their
conceptions of efficiency and integrity. Should not legislatures, therefore,
permit shareholders, to invest their savings in corporate enterprise without
inventing paternalistic legal devices for their protection?
There are some who would even today answer that question in the affirma-
tive. But there are many who insist that, because of the separation between
ownership and control in the large modern corporation-subsuming under
that phrase both those cases in which a corporation is controlled by a minority
and those in which a controlling majority has interests more or less antagonistic
to those of the minority-and because of the fluidity of contract rights under
modern corporate charters, no modern business corporation act can be regarded
as satisfactory unless it provides substantial safeguards for the shareholder,
particularly the minority shareholder. A decade ago, in the heydey of the
New Deal, some-though by no means all-of those who held such views came
to the conclusion that the best method of protecting the investors in large
corporations, as well as the consumers of their products and their smaller com-
petitors, would be to enact a federal incorporation law of a regulatory char-
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acter and to require all corporations over a certain size which were engaged in
interstate commerce to incorporate under it.
Such views have not prevailed. Certain types of corporations-particularly
public utility holding companies and their subsidiaries-have been subjected
to a rather drastic measure of federal control largely for the purpose of in-
vestor protection. But even such corporations are not required to adopt federal
charters. Most other corporations, except when they make a public offering
of their securities or require reorganization, are permitted to organize and
operate under state laws with very little federal regulation of the relations
betwveen their managers and their shareholder-owners. Some of them are, to
be sure, subject to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, but the
provisions of that act which affect corporations rather than security exchanges
are of very limited scope.
The Preliminary Draft of a Federal Corporation Act which has been pre-
pared by the Corporation Law Committee of the American Bar Association
is not a revival of the proposals of a decade ago for compulsory federal incor-
poration. On the contrary, the Committee proposes a non-compulsory federal
act, which would be available to the organizers of corporations, but which would
be used by them only if they should deem incorporation under that act preferable
from their point of view to incorporation under the laws of some one of the
forty-eight states.
It is inevitable that a draft of a non-compulsory federal act should contain no
radical departures from existing state models. Most organizers of corpora-
tions expect to control the corporations wlich they form. They do not neces-
sarily desire to incorporate under the law which gives the most unbridled free-
dom to the controlling group. But none of them would needlessly choose in-
corporation under a statute which subjected their activities to unusually drastic
regulation. An optional federal incorporation law need not be a Chinese copy
of the law of Delaware. On the other hand, it cannot, if it is to be more than
a dead-letter, be much more restrictive than the more carefully safeguarded
state corporation laws, such as those of Illinois or California.
The Committee's draft, or rather that portion of it which has been com-
pleted, adopts, for the most part word-foi-word, the provisions of the Business
Corporation Act of Illinois. On the assumption that that act is model legis-
lation, its substantial duplication by a federal statute might be desirable. It
is true that the Illinois Act is available to every business cqrporation, regard-
less of the situs of its operations. But incorporation under a federal act which
provided for filing of articles of incorporation with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and for establishing the corporate domicile in any place
which might be desired, would be more likely to appeal to corporate organizers
in states remote from Illinois than would incorporation under an Illinois
statute, at least if doubts as to the constitutionality of the federal act and the
constitutional status of corporations formed pursuant to it could be set at
-rest. The Illinois Act is unquestionably one of the better state acts, both becauge
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of the policies which underlie it and because of the careful draftsmanship by
which those policies have been given expression. For my part, however, I
should be unwilling to accept it as a model without substantial changes.
Apparently the Committee either has not read or has not been impressed by
certain criticisms of the Illinois Act which Professor Ballantine, the drafts-
man of the California Corporation Act, made some years ago.1 I agree with
many of Professor Ballantine's criticisms, but I shall review the Committee's
draft from a somewhat different point of view, considering chiefly to what ex-
tent it might be revised so as to give greater protection to non-controlling share-
holders without defeating its purpose of offering to organizers a method of
incorporation which they might be willing to accept.
The non-controlling shareholder needs legal protection with respect to five
subjects which overlap to some extent. He needs effective enforcement of the
fiduciary obligations of officers, directors and controlling shareholders. He needs
to have voting rights equitably distributed. He needs adequate restrictions on
the funds which are legally available for dividends and for purchases of a cor-
poration's own shares and effective means of enforcing those restrictions. He
needs safeguards against abuse of the power to make organic changes in the
structure of the enterprise by amendment, merger or consolidation. Finally, he
needs to be assured of adequate and readily available information about the
corporation's activities and the state of its finances.
Effective enforcement of fiduciary obligations requires both satisfactory
rules of substantive law and adequate procedural means of enforcing those
rules. The Committee's draft makes no attempt to deal with the fiduciary
obligations of management. The effect is to leave questions of substantive law
relating, to such obligations to the decisions of the federal courts and ques-
tions of procedure to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a disposition
of the matter may be desirable. The provisions relating to the fiduciary obliga-
tions of management and the validity of transactions between corporations
and their managers that are found in existing state corporation statutes are
dubious improvements on the equitable principles established by judicial
decisions. Although much might be said in favor of a requirement that certain
types of transactions between corporations and their directors or officers
should be valid only if approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission,"
the inclusion of a provision to that effect in a voluntary incorporation act
would have a strong tendency to make promoters unwilling to seek incorpora-
tion under it.
On the question of voting rights, the Committee's draft establishes a rigid
rule of one vote per share 3 with the further provision that certain types of
1. Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Corporation Act (1934) 1 U. olt
C. L. Rzv. 357.





amendments require a vote of classes.4 Such a system of voting fails to give
sufficient protection to preferred shareholders whose dividends are seriously
in arrears. Many modern preferred share issues have as one of their terms a
provision permitting the holders of such shares to elect a majority of the
directors if their dividends have been in arrears for a certain period. The
federal Investment Company Act and the reorganization chapter of the federal
Bankruptcy Act require such provisions. It would be desirable to accelerate
the trend in that direction by including in the draft a mandatory provision
for such voting rights.
Limitations on funds available for purchase of shares and for dividends
are matters of vital importance both to creditors and to shareholders. Sec-
tion 5 of the Committee's draft in effect forbids the use of any funds except
earned surplus for the purchase of shares other than redeemable shares. This
restrictive provision, copied from the Illinois Act, is a salutary one and is in
sharp contrast to the laws of most states, wlich permit unearned surplus-in
some jurisdictions even capital-to be dissipated in the purchase of common4
shares. The act is, however, defective in failing to spell out the legal conse-
quences of purchases made in violation of the section. It is not clear, for ex-
ample, whether the liability imposed on directors by section 41 for assenting
to "the declaration of a dividend or other [improper] distribution of assets"
to shareholders covers the case of an improper purchase of some of the cor-
poration's shares.
The Committee's draft similarly limits the funds available for dividends
to earned surplus, except that it permits capital surplus to be used for the pay-
ment of preferred dividends,: imposing a qualified liability on directors who
assent to the declaration of improper dividends." There are situations in which
it is sound policy for a corporation which, despite impairment of its capital, is
in a strong financial condition, to use some part of its current earnings for the
payment of dividends. It may, however, be thought desirable to require the
assent of a majority of the shareholders to such use of current earnings. The
Committee's draft in effect permits majority shareholders to sanction %uch
dividends, since it authorizes the elimination of a capital deficit by a shareholdvrs
vote for capital reduction.7 The result thus attained seems satisfactory in the
case of a corporation wi~h only one class of shares. On the other hand, as applied
to a corporation with both preferred and common shares, the dividend restriction
is likely to have unfortunate consequences. Experience proves that statutes
which require a shareholders' vote for capital reduction in order to make
current earnings legally available for dividends frequently enable the holders
of common shares to extort inequitable concessions from the preferred share-
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many respects more like income bonds than like common shares. No one would
think of making the assent of the common shareholders a prerequisite, under any
circumstance, to the use of current earnings for the payment of interest on in-
come bonds. To require such assent to their use for the payment of preferred
dividends is hardly less objectionable.
Section 51 of the draft grants a broad power to amend the articles of in-
corporation. Although the section permits reclassification of shares and change
of preferences, it is not unlikely that it would be construed, like the Delaware
and New York amendment provisions, to forbid the funding of accruals by
amendment unless the preferred shareholders are given the option either to
accept an exchange offer which eliminated their accruals or to retain their
accruals but be subordinated in their dividend and liquidation rights to those
members of the class who make the exchange. Such an interpretation would
be unfortunate. If funding of accruals is to be permitted, it is preferable to
allow it to be accomplished straightforwardly, subject to judicial or adminis-
trative review of the fairness of the plan, without the hocus-pocus of a
pseudo-voluntary surrender of accrual rights which is in fact coerced by fear
of the consequences of subordination. It might be desirable to incorporate in a
federal corporation act a provision, similar to section 7 of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act,8 which would necessitate the approval of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission for all alterations of preferential rights. It
may be that the insertion of such a provision in a non-compulsory federal
act would unduly discourage incorporation under it. But the act should at least
contain a provision granting appraisal rights to those who dissent from an
amendment which changes their preferences-a desirable safeguard which is
found in the corporation laws of several states.
Such an appraisal right is granted by the Committee's draft to those who
dissent from the provisions of a merger, consolidation 9 or bulk sale of cor-
porate assets.10 As is usual in state corporation acts, there is no requirement
for a vote by classes on proposals for merger or consolidation. Merger with a
wholly-owned subsidiary is often employed primarily or even exclusively for
the purpose of changing preferences and eliminating accrued dividend claims.
Such mergers are bargains between classes of the parent corporation's share-
holders rather than bargains between corporations. The reasons which call
for a class vote on amendments which alter preferences are equally applicable
to such mergers. In fact, if the proposed federal act should be interpreted as
the Delawate act has been interpreted, the power to change preferences by
the elimination of accruals would be broader if merger rather than amend-
ment were the method used.





With respect to shareholder information, a provision of the draft,"' identi-
cal with that of the Illinois Act as recently amended, safeguards the share-
holder's right of access to books and records. The subject of corporation re-
ports, a matter of far greater importance to the non-litigious small investor
than the right of individual access to corporate records, is to be dealt with in a
section which has not yet been drafted.
Would the proposed act, if enacted either in its present form or with some
such additional safeguards for investors as I have suggested, serve a useful
purpose? Whatever its theoretical merits, it would not be used unless cor-
poration lawyers felt able to advise their clients not only that the act was
constitutional but that corporations formed under it would-with respect to
such state laws as exclusionary, regulatory, and tax laws-be in no worse
position than state corporations. A federal corporation act which purports, as
this draft does, to create federal corporations rather than corporations of the
District of Columbia or of some federal territory must be linked up with some
federal power, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce. The present
draft is not so linked. Unless provisions taking care of this constitutional
difficulty were inserted, the statute, if enacted, might be stillborn.
Although Section 4 of the act states that each corporation formed under the
act shall have power to carry on its operations in any state, territory, district,
or possession of the United States, or in any foreign country, there would
seem to be doubt whether, even if the act were so phrased as to be based on the
inter-state commerce power, it would be held to authorize corporations formed
under it to engage in intra-state business without qualifying in the same man-
ner as foreign corporations. Even if Congress could give such a right to cor-
porations formed by it under the commerce power, the courts might decline
to construe the grant of power as an authorization to do local business without
the consent of the state in the absence of a specific statement in the act that
qualification under local laws is unnecessary. But, however this may be, there
is little doubt that in practice such corporations would be admitted even to do
local business, as foreign corporations normally are. Presumably their tax
status under state aws would be similar to that of foreign corporations.
It may be that, if the constitutional basis far the statute were clarified
by revision, its substantial merits would be sufficient inducement to cause a
considerable number of corporate organizers to seek incorporation under it and
to cause some existing state corporations to reincorporate under it. A trend
towards incorporation under such a federal act rather than under laxer state
acts would be one in the right direction.
Inauguration of such a trend, however, would be but a very short step in
the right direction. Neither the act in its present form nor any alterations
which could be made to it without destroying the likelihood of voluntary in-
1. Section 44.
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corporation under it would be adequate to give the corporate investor as
much protection as he needs. What is necessary for that protection is not
federal incorporation, voluntary or involuntary, but federal regulation of all
corporations of substantial size whose shares are not closely held. In the present
climate of political opinion, enactment of such regulatory legislation appears
exceedingly unlikely. A statute such as the Committee proposes, which offers
to corporate promoters the privilege of submitting their enterprises to a mild
-form of federal regulation if they choose to do so, is much more in line with
current trends. The enactment of such a statute, amended so as to eliminate
constitutional objections, would be a worthwhile achievement. Even if the
statute resulted in the formation of relatively few federal corporations, its
enactment by Congress would strengthen the position of those who are seek-
ing to bring into disrepute some of the more obvious laxities of many of our
state corporation laws. Meanwhile, the fact that the Corporation Law Com-
mittee of the American Bar Association has modelled its proposals on the
corporation law of Illinois rather than on that of Delaware is encouraging.
Freedom of contract to the extent permitted by Delaware and many other states
is an inadequate guiding principle for the governing law of a type of business
association in which profit-sharing is not accompanied by personal liability for
the payment of debts and control is largely divorced from ownership.
E. MERRICx DODD t
THE POA ER INDUSTRY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Arthur R. Burns, Research
Director. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1944. Pp. xiv, 261. $2.00.
THIS book, the product of an investigation sponsored and financed by the
Twentieth Century Fund, is concerned with the electric industry, an industry
basic to the country's war production and one which will be fundamental to an
expanding national economy after the war. The technical studies were made
chiefly in 1941, and constituted a report of over 1,000 pages. Since under war
conditions such a huge publication was impracticable, a rigid condensation was
prepared. The book contains twelve chapters, an explanatory foreword, and a
detailed table of contents; but there is no index and no bibliography; nor are
there specific references to other books, articles or public reports. The first
eleven chapters are devoted to the staff findings and account; the final chapter
presents the "Report and Recommendations of the Power Committee."
The eleven staff chapters are extremely succinct. The first, only ten printed
pages, surveys the history of the industry: the technological developments,
the transformation from independent local concerns to huge holding company
systems, the cost of furnishing service, and the rates paid by consumers. The
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
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next five chapters are devoted to public regulation of the private electric sys-
tems. The chapter headings indicate the scope: "Rate Regulation: Agencies
and Problems"; "Regulation in Practice"; "Regulation: Effects and Ap-
praisal"; "Financial Regulation"; and "Regulation of Market Area Control."
The following four chapters present the existing public organization: "lunici-
pal Ownership and Operation" ; "Public Rural Electric Systems" ; "Federal and
State Projects"; and "The TVA." The final staff chapter, "Meeting the Na-
tion's Needs," emphasizes comprehensive coordination of facilities, functional
separation of generation, transmission and distribution, readjustment of gov-
ernment policy, provision for regional regulation, and summarizes "public
versus private operation."
Although from a factual viewpoint the condensation is a distinct success,
it inevitably lacks the focus and emphasis which are essential for anyone not
already having a thorough knowledge of past happenings. The first chapter, for
example, contains less than two pages on the development of the holding com-
pany systems, and hence could not convey to the uninitiate adequate compre-
hension of the gross corporate, capital, territorial and managerial distortions
that were imposed upon the industry and could only be removed through
extraordinary measures and herculean efforts. Nor is there, in the more liberal
space devoted to the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Federal Power Commission, sufficient recording of the financial and managerial
complexes to be untangled.
The summarization job is marred also by occasional lapses in accuracy which
create erroneous inferences. In the chapter on "Financial Regulation," for
example, the first section outlining state regulation starts as follows: "The
regulation of security issues of public utilities began in Massachusetts as long
ago as 1871. The Bay State early came to regard securities regulation as the
basis of rate regulation. The theory was that rates should return sufficient
revenues to pay dividends upon capital stock issued in amounts and at prices
approved by public authorities. The example set by Massachusetts was not
followed elsewhere." I The statement of statutory enactment is correct, but
the implication that the stated policy has been carried out is certainly wrong.
The account passes over the fact that, once the stock issues were approved,
the commission did virtally nothing to see that the investments were duly
protected and were not subsequently impaired by unwarranted dividend pay-
ments or failure to provide properly for the depreciation of physical plant and
equipment. As a result of the failure to continue regulation, many millions
of Massachusetts utility stocks, which once represented prudent investment,
are now outstanding without support of physical plant and equipment.
In another place, the staff account presents a vivid picture of the tremen-
dous tax increases from 1902 to 1940. The bare facts are all right, but they
are followed by this misleading statement: "These high taxes are largely
1. P. 68.
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passed on to consumers. In setting rates regulatory authorities apparently
allow most taxes, including federal income taxes, to be included as an operat-
ing expense." 2 The implication is that high rates have been fixed by the com-
missions because of high taxes. The truth is that high taxes have generally
followed high rates in order to recapture excess earnings tolerated under un-
workable methods of regulation.
The chief criticisms of the book center in the final chapter, the Commit-
tee's own report. Of the Committee, only one person, James C. Bonbright,
could be regarded as combining a comprehensive knowledge of the industry
with an unobstructed perspective in dealing constructively with the relative
private and public interests. The other members are Samuel Ferguson and
Paul A. Schoellkopf, both prominent in the realm of private utility control;
J. Henry Scattergood, the Chairman, chiefly connected with private corporate
enterprise though also a former member of the Pennsylvania commission;
Larue Brown, once special counsel for the Massachusetts commission, with
considerable experience in public affairs; and Murry D. Lincoln, active in
farm organizations. While as a group these men do not support the extremes
of private electric power positions, with the exception of Bonbright they would
almost inevitably view with trepidation a comprehensive program of public
ownership and operation, and cannot help but ignore, or treat lightly, the grave
distortions of the private systems. Suggestive of their temperament are the nine
dissenting or supplementary footnotes by Bonbright.
The Committee devotes the second section of its report to taxes, favoring
generally revision and reduction, and urging particularly abolition of the
federal excess profits tax. It views the tax as depressing net corporate earn-
ings, and consequently impairing company credit and restricting the avail-
ability of capital funds for future plant expansion. But the fact is that the
federal excess profits tax has, in the main, impinged only on companies with
actual excess earnings. In 1943 the maximum was 90 per cent on taxable in-
come above an average of about 6.5 per cent on invested capital, which during
war time is hardly oppressive. Any company with reasonable rates, obtaining
a fair return on investment and no more, was not subject to such a tax.
Nor is the Committee's fear that needed capital funds might not be avail-
able well founded; for moderately well-organized and financed operating
companies are able to issue bonds at 3 to 3.5 per cent interest, compared with
5 per cent and over during the 1920's, before high taxeg really set in. Its
concern over losses caused to investors through the divestment proceedings
under the Securities and Exchange Commission ignores the fact that the dis-
posals have been predicated primarily on the earnings realized under past
excessive rates. A more valid fear would be that the divestments might result




Despite the staff's rather critical account of regulation, the Committee
largely disregards the difficulties involved and reaches the easygoing pro-
posal that future rate making be based upon formal negotiations. Bon-
bright dissents from this conclusion, undoubtedly believing that control can
be made effective only if definite standards are established so that regular
rate adjustments will be made as a matter of systematic and factual determina-
tion. Fortunately, the Supreme Court, in the recent Hope Natural Gas Cow-
pany decision,3 completely discarded the hodgepodge of past legal require-
ments as to "fair value" and the resulting unworkable procedure. Regulation
can now be made an exact and regular process, definitely establishing and
protecting the relative private and public rights.
Finally, while the Committee is tolerant of public ownership and opera-
tion, it virtually disregards that form of organization in its consideration of
future policy and program. In the final section, it poses a question which it
holds no committee can answer: " ... the attitude which the public, of which
government is only the organized representative, will take toward this great
and vitally important business organization." This reviewer submits that
the public attitude will depend chiefly upon the facts, analyses and proposals
presented by these organized representatives of the public. If they continue
to overlook the incrusted distortions of the private system, and join in sup-
porting the basic untruths propagandized by private utility interests, the public
attitude may for a long time tolerate an inherently intolerable situation: high
private system rates perpetuated through over-capitalization, lack of effi-
cient territorial integration, extravagant managements, excessive capital re-
turns, and, particularly, the underlying conflicts of interest between the small
groups of private control and the public at large.
Satisfactory solution of the problems of the country's electric power will
compel open-minded consideration of two fundamental questions. First, can
the disintegrated, privately organized systems be satisfactorily reintegrated and
regulated so that they will be directed toward the public interest? Second,
in view of the unfortunate traditions of private enterprise, should nut the
industry be acquired by the public with full fair compensation for actual
private investments? Such a conversion might obviate all private obstructions
and make possible the furnishing of adequate electric power at minimum avail-
able cost for the economic and social advancement of all sections of the country.
JoHN BAuER t
3. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
t Director, The American Public Utilities Bureau.
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LAV ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE (1664-1776). By Julius Goebel Jr. and T. Raymond Naughton.
New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1944. Pp. xxxix, 867. $5.00.
IN this volume; which is a monument of scholarly scruple and industry,
Professor Goebel and Mr. Naughton have sought to describe in all possible
detail the doctrine and practice of criminal procedure in colonial New York
from the English 'conquest in 1664 to the State constitution of 1777. Here
is the richest store of material yet to be gathered on the difficult subject of
the reception of English common law in America; until now, generalizations
and hypotheses have far outrun the information at hand.
According to the authors one must distinguish two stages in the reception
of English law in New York Province. During the first period (1664-1683),
"the Duke of York's lieutenants with great skill promoted as the provincial
law the little they knew of English local administration. One will find few
reminis~ences of Coke in what was done, but much of it will responsively
footnote The Countrey Justice."' In the second stage (1684-1776), after the
arrival of Governor Thomas Dongan and the enactment of the new judicature
law, "a change of profound importance occurred. Within a few short months
the whole procedural apparatus is renovated, the practices and forms of the
English central courts come into use-the second stage of reception which will
endure until the Revolution is under way." 2
This thesis is clearly stated in Professor Goebel's introduction, and remains
something of a chart to help the reader find his way through the wilderness
into which he is led. One often wishes, however, that the trail were more
clearly marked through these many pages. Still, much information is given
which has bearing on the thesis, and it is worth digging for. The recognizance,
for example, became, very soon after the English conquest, the usual means
of exacting security in New York. Suretyship devices had long been important
institutions of English local government, and the recognizance was probably
the most popular of them in the seventeenth century. "This circumstance
was a factor of consequence in the history of similar devices in America for
... it was the local and the familiar legal institution which first gained footing
overseas." 3 The recognizance was "if not indispensable, at least peculiarly
suited to the needs of a government in a province reduced by force and inhabited
by persons of whose loyalty it was impossible to be sure." 4 The law of bail
is another example of this first stage of the reception. "The reaction of the
colonial lawyers to the intricacies of the English law of bail is not to their
credit as inventors. Instead of adopting as a point of departure the admittedly
1. P. xxiii (italics added).





unlimited discretion of King's Bench to bail even for treason or murder, the
cases show that the debated powers of inferior judges served as a model
for provincial policy." r
The English lawyer of the late seventeenth century was faced with a be-
wildering confusion of jurisdictions. judicial power had been given out piece-
meal by enfeoffment and franchise, new courts had been created without the
abolition of old, and the different courts were in constant conflict and com-
petition. But the New York Judicature Act of 1691 vested the provincial
Supreme Court with the powers at once of King's Bench, Common Pleas
and Exchequer and forestalled any similar conflict here. This very consolida-
tion of jurisdictions posed to the conscientious colonial judge the difficult
task of selecting his own procedure. "If [in the Supreme Court] a becond
process was needed to summon jurors, should it be the disirigas of King's
Bench or the habeas corpus of Common Bench? Should an Exchequer info r-
mation be brought on a forfeited bond, or a scire facias, and if the latter what
leeway should defendant have-that given by the Barons or that given by the
Lords Justices?" 6 One result of this uncertainty was an almost unlimited
judicial control over the conduct of litigation. The Supreme Court, in the best
English tradition, was unwilling to hear challenges to its jurisdiction. "Since
agitation for decentralization was never entirely dormant, a Supreme Court
jealous of its predominance was consequently a decisive factor in the recep-
tion of those common law rules and theories which would make for a hierachy
and not for a congeries of jurisdictions with competitive ambitions." 7 Illus-
trations of this are found in the development of the transfer system, the sus-
pension of inferior courts in the county where the Supreme Court was sit-
ting, and various other devices to limit Special Sessions.
These pages raise a host of interesting and tantalizing questions which
cannot be satisfactorily answered from the mere history of legal technology
which is the primary concern of the volume. The propertied classes showed a
warm enthusiasm for common law due process, and yet extended the tcope
of summary procedure to include a mass of petty misdemeanors. How can
one explain their "partiality for summary procedure"? 8 How does one account
for the constantly lengthening list of qui tain actions, by which the subject
was deprived of a grand jury and usually also of a trial jury? How explain
the increasing restraint of judges in dealing with jury verdicts in the latest
colonial period? Why was the fine "the sanction par excellence of provincial
criminal justice"? 9 Why the disappearance of escheat and forfeiture? Why
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1750? Professor Goebel and Mr. Naughton raise these questions, but, except
for a few sentences in each case, they do not provide the answers. They
seem determined not to go outside "legal" history, nor to concern themselves
with the behavior of others than lawyers, sheriffs, judges, and litigants. It is
doubtful if any one of these significant problems can be solved even tentatively
unless one goes boldly outside legal materials and explores social and economic
history.
Yet these authors try to explain the almost autonomous development of the
lawyer's technique. They are impressed with 'how tough-minded the settlers
were, and how few concessions were made to the circumstances of place." "0
After an immoderate attack on the "frontier" and "formative era" theories by
which "the law of the colonial period is relegated to the antiquarian, and the law
of post-Revolutionary time is enthroned as the true American law," It the
authors themselves pursue a method which verges dangerously on antiquarian-
ism.
This work is clearly in the tradition of English legal historiography: it
shows the sensitive scholarly conscience of a Maitland and the prodigious
industry of a Holdsworth. These qualities are beyond praise. But whatever
the virtues of the English legal historians, it is undeniable that their vice has
been a narrow professionalism. The methodological implication of this mono-
graph is that legal historians should aim to provide "complete" treatises, which
would expound with indiscriminate thoroughness the total facts of the history
of an autonomous professional technology.
But life is short. One cannot hope ever to empty the vast ocean of fact with
the thimble of monographs. Particularly in America, where our legal records
are widely dispersed, and our jurisdictions numerous, scholars must be more
selective in their curiosity. The efforts of American legal historians in the
next generations will be spent more economically if they do not aim to encom-
pass the amorphous totality of fact, but rather to understand a process by posing
particular problems and studying particular examples. If the present work
does riot contribute directly to our understanding of the place of law in the
social process, it does provide invaluable raw materials from which future
studies may be made.
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN t
10. P. xxii.
11. P. xx.
t Professor of History, Swarthmore College.
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FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING. By George 0. May. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1943. Pp. 274. $3.00.
MucH earlier in the history of their professio-n than lawyers, accountants
became realists. There have been few, if any, accounting analogues to seizin,
springing uses, irrebuttable presumptions, or the other fictional paraphernalia
of the law. Almost contemporaneously with the emergence of interpretative
accounting out of the technique of double-entry bookkeeping, leading ac-
countants hammered away to. make clear to the public that an accounting
"fact" is the result of measurement according to a partially arbitrary technique
and definition; that an accounting principle is not discoz'cred like a law of
physics or the common-law, as the old jurists conceived it; but is a convention
adopted because it is considered useful, like a principle of law in the mind of
one of today's realistic jurists.
These points have repeatedly been made by George 0. May, formerly head
of the largest public accounting firm and a prominent figure in the American
Institute of Accountants.
Mr. May's latest book, Financial Accounting, makes this point again and
again. The book is significant mainly because this point is used as the foundation
for an explicit statement of a long inarticulate protest of the accounting pro-
fession against government supervision. Pieced out of insinuations and in-
nuendoes, the book's argument goes as follows: Accounting is essentially
utilitarian, its rules and principles being conventions-postulates derived from
experience-and subject to change as practical considerations and experience
may dictate. " Accountants' financial statements may have to serve various,
possibly conflicting, functions (of which ten are listed), and it is unfair to
hold the accountant to responsibility if a statement prepared for one purpose
is resorted to for another purpose.2 The most appropriate convention may
vary with the purpose for which the accounts are to be used.3 It is less im-
portant, therefore, that fibancial statements be based on accounting principles
deemed to be correct than that the principles be uniform from period to period.4
Mr. May would allow corporations, within wide limits, to choose their methods
of accounting, but would require them to disclose the methods used and to adhere
to these methods from year to year.; The only sanctions would be those pro-
vided by the accounting profession and public opinion. He considers that a
1. C. I and III.
2. Cc. I and II. As Mr. May has elsewhere expressed it, to make one set of state-
ments serve all purposes would be equivalent to expecting a knife to perform all of the
functions of table silver. See May, Eating Pcas With Your Knife (1937) 63 J. Ac-
COUNTANCY 15.
3. P. 19.
4. Pp. 76, 77.
5. A committee of the American Institute of Accountants (of which ir. May was
chairman) made this proposal to the New York Stock Exchange in 1932.
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grave mistake was made when, by reason of the passage of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, leadership in accounting
matters passed from the New York Stock Exchange to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. This change, he feels, impaired the professional
status of accountants, striking "a wanton and unjustified blow" at the pro-
fession by "taking the responsibility for accounting rules and principles out of
its hands and placing it in those of a policy-making body that wag not expert
... on which there was no accounting representation." (
But the issue is deeper than the avowed desire of the accounting profession
to assume a full measure of responsibility. Mr. May's resentment of govern-
ment interference and his opposition to uniform principles seem to add up to
a pattern of distaste for any standard by which the work of accountants can
be judged. Accepting his view that accounting is a utilitarian art rather than
a science, one can deny the need to vary the conventions as each "artist" may
think proper. Mr. May's conclusions as to proper principles 7 show that it is
possible to select uniform principles to a..much greater extent than he admits
in his early chapters. Some principles may not be capable of uniform appli-
cation, but that does not mean that there must be free choice case by case.
Classification is possible, and, as Mr. May points out,8 the Committee on
Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of Accountants (of which
committee he is a member) is engaged in the classification of industries for
the purpose of obtaining uniformity in accounting for inventories.
Mr. May fails to show in support of his charge that the government has at-
tempted to force on the profession an impossible degree of uniformity,
that the SEC has refused to recognize differences in industries which call for
different treatment of particular problems or that the Commission's approach
to uniformity is any more rigid than that of the Institute's Committee on Ac-
counting Procedure. In claiming that the SEC's assumption of leadership
has been a "wanton and unjustified blow" at the professional status of ac-
coutats, Mr. May also cotradicts himself. He recognizes that injection of
the Commission into the picture was financially advantageous to the profes-
sion, and, more significantly, that its role has strengthened the accountant's
position in relation to the corporation. Moreover, he admits that the "Coin-
6. Pp. 62, 64. Mr. May finds in the "growth of accounting by prescription .... a
shift from the common-law mode of thought towards that of the civil code." P. 5.
Mr. May also mentions another dispute existing within the ranks of accountants, in
which the line of cleavage is much the same as that between accountants like Mr. May
and the government. In contrast to practicing accountants who place principal emphasis
on disclosure of methods and adherence thereto, many academic accountants (like gov-
ernmental authorities) favor the adoption as rapidly as possible of uniform accounting
standards. Mr. May swiftly disposes of the academic accountants by saying that they
are unduly afraid of the possibility of managerial misrepresentation; they are too sus-
picious in order not to appear too naive (pp. 10-13).




mission has up to now exercised the power to prescribe accounting rules...
with restraint, and judiciously. Its decisions on general accounting questions
have usually been reached after consultation with the Institute. Its influence
on accounting practice in the field of general business has undoubtedly been
beneficial." 9 Finally, Mr. May's contention that the accountant has been de-
graded because he has become responsible only for the application of rules
laid down by a "body that was not expert" would not seem sound, since the
Commission's staff has always included many certified public accountants, 0
and in ten years it has had a unique opportunity to develop experiments. More-
over, the professional status of lawyers and judges has not been impaired be-
cause legislatures-frequently including many laynen-make laws which the
profession must accept.
Underlying Mr. May's arguments, there seems to be a desire of the account-
ing profession to avoid responsibility. This desire presents two very real prob-
lems: first, whether the profession should be bound by certain objective
standards of good accounting, and, second, whether there should be govern-
mental supervision of accountants to assure adequate financial disclosure by
business enterprises.
With respect to the problem of objective standards, over-empasis on the
conventional character of accounting and on the need for wide discretion in
the selection of applicable conventions would make accounting an aesthetic
rather than a practical art. The graphic artist cannot be gainsaid if he says
he painted the cow purple because that is the way he saw it. And to the
extent that agreement on accounting principles is delayed or resisted, so that
accounting remains a matter of "art," accountants remain socially irresponsible
and their conclusions remain unreliable. Similarly, if Mr. May's oft-repeated
claim that statements prepared for one purpose may not properly be used for
other purposes were accepted, the accountant's responsibility would be mini-
mized by reducing the utility of statements. Actually, there is little room
for special purpose statements. Possibly a statement for a short-term credit
should be ultra conservative in its treatment of all but current assets, and one
for a bankrupt concern should show the plant at quick sale value instead of at
depreciated cost. Beyond this, I must disagree with Mr. May's classification
of the uses of financial statements into an older group for reports cn the past and
a new one in which the past is used as a measure of the future."' Determination..
of fiscal and dividend policy, for instance, are uses which, though classified
9. P. 66.
10. In its formative years the Securities and Exchange Commission obtained the ad-
vice of T. H. Sanders, Professor of Accounting at the Harvard University Graduate
School of Business Administration. See Sanders, Accounting Aspects of the Sccuritics
Act (1937) 4 LAw AND CoxrTEmmoRARY PROBLEms 191. Prof. Sanders was subsequently
co-author of a work sponsored by the American Institute of Accountants. SAmoEns, IL%-
FIELD AND Mooz , A STATE=T OF AccouNxG PRINCIPLES (1938).
11. Pp. 19-22.
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in the older group, look at the future as well as the past. Similarly, there
would seem to be no reason for Mr. May's distinction between the use of
statements to inform prospective investors and as a guide to the valtie of
existing investments, and use thereof as a report on stewardship. So long as
accountants do not try to be prophets, financial statements which honestly
report the past ought not, except for arrangement or emphasis, to vary sub-
stantially with iheir intended use. As Mr. May himself recognizes, "Financial
statements are usually'intended to be acted upon, and once issued they, may
be put to any one of many uses by those into whose hands they come.' 12
On the question of governmental supervision, it would seem that responsi-
bility for assuring adequate financial disclosure by business should not be left
e'xclusively to the accounting profession. No profession ancillary to business,
no matter how high-minded its practitioners may be, can be really independent
of its employers. Few would now suggest that the policing of the securities
markets could safely be left exclusively to the financial bar, the investment
banking profession, or the stock exchanges. Like a lawyer, an accountant is an
advocate for his client. This relationship between accountant and client is
12. P. 19. Mr. May's exposition of the need for flexibility merely seems to emphasize
that change must be channelled through governmental agencies, rather than through
the individual accountant's conscience, or self-regulation by the profession. A recent case,
Associated Gas and Elect. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3285A, Aug. 5, 1942,
illustrates this point. In an opinion delisting corporate securities, principally because of
gross inaccuracies in the financial statements accompanying the registration statement,
the SEC criticized the company's public accountants for certifying the statements. Illus-
trative of the deficiencies was the failure to distribute charges to earned and capital stir-
plfis, in accordance with accepted standards. The accountants sought to justify their
failure to except explicitly to this feature of the statements, by the explanation that "we
were probably acting on the theory that there was no clear distinction between earned
and capital surplus anyway in the method they kept their accounts." Id. at 79. In other
words, the accountants' certified statements used the ordinary vocabulary of accounting,
as a code in which the words were given special ambiguous meanings.
Yet the Council of the American Institute of Accountants disagreed completelywith
the Commission's criticism of the accountants. See Report of Action of the Council
of the Awterica); Institute of Accountants in the M1latter of Associated Gas and Electric
Company (1944) 77 J. AccouNTANcy 162. This report, exonerating the accountants in
all respects, failed to mention the misleading treatment of surplus, described above, or
other points at which the accountants were most vulnerable. The report strongly gives
the impression that the Council chose to comment only on those of the Commission's critl
cisms to which it thought it had good answers. The careful omissions suggest that the
Council members, called to sit in judgment upon a colleague, were thinking, "but for
the grace of God, there go I." If the vagaries practiced in the delisting case do not call
for criticism of the accountants, then a public accountant's certification of financial state-
ments is a tenuous assurance of the reliability of the statements. And, if there is any validity
to the Council's argument that at the time of the statements (1934-1937) the principles in
question had not been crystallized, we can only conclude that any reliance on accountants'
financial statements up to that time was misplaced. This inept rationalization for a refusal
to criticize practice less than ten years old is the best commentary on the public accountants'
opposition to "rigid" or "rapid" crystallization of principles.
(Vol, 53,
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well illustrated in the role accountants have played in the struggle of the
pullic utility industry against reduction of rate bases by public regulatory
commissions. The issue has thus far been confused because it has been argued
in accounting terminology: how to treat the difference between the "original
cost" of plant and the cost to the present owner.13 Accountants, with the ex-
ception of those employed by regulatory commissions, have unanimously sided
with the utility industry, refusing to look behind the accounting concepts to
the underlying regulatory struggle. Performing a double duty, they have
testified for utility companies as expert witnesses and, at the same time, at-
tacked the regulatory position in periodicals as purportedly impartial authori-
ties.1 4
In accounting, as in law, there is a continual necessity to strike a transient
trial balance between rigidity and flexibility. Any veteran lawyer can in the
course of a single day's business condemn a given departure from precedent
by talking contemptuously about "railroad tickets good only for a single day
and a single train," and then argue out of the other side of his mouth that
the law must be continuously adopted to changing social and economic con-
ditions. With similar advocate's license, Mr. May speaks of the conven-
tional character of accounting and the need for using judgment in preparing
every particular company's balance sheet, while simultaneously condemning
regulatory commissions for introducing undue flexibility and departure from
fbied principles.' 5
Apart from the emotive verbiage aroused by Mr. May's dislike of govern-
ment regulation, the whole philosophy of Financial Accounting is in favor of
a degree of flexibility so great as to leave the accountant irresponsible because
no norms are left to which he must conform. This note is sounded just after
a number of administrative and legislative studies have criticized accounting
firms,16 and payments of substantial sums by the firms in settlement of assorted
13. The writer has sought to explore the accounting issues and to reveal the under-
lying issues in Kripke, A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform
Accounts 100.5 and 107 (1944) 57 Hav. L. RFv. 433, 693.
14. See May, Accounting and Regulation (1943) 76 J. Accou.rA:;c" 295 (sub-
stantially reprinted as the final chapter of FixANCIAL Accouxtir1xG); Paton, Accoutning
Policies of the Federal Power Commission-A Critique (1944) 77 J. Accour.A:;c" 432,
Sanders, Government by "Accounting Principles" (1944) 22 HAMR. Bus. REv. 265. All
of these authors testified for Arkansas Power & Light Company on points closely re-
lated to the subjects of their articles, in a proceeding involving that company before the
Arkansas Department of Public Utilities, early in 1944.
15. See, e.g., c. XIV and p. 67. See also May, Accounting Principles and Rcgulatory
Expediency (1941) 71 J. AccoUNTANcy 116; May, Northwestern Electric Co. (1943) 75
J. AccoumAcv 451.
16. See, e.g., Associated Gas and Elect. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
3285A, Aug. 5, 1942; SEC REoaTr oN INVESTIGATION IN THE MArFR O' McKEsso: &
RoBaiNs, Irc. (1940); Missouri Pacific R. Co., 6 S. E. C. 263 (1939); Fallibility of
Auditors' Certificates (Preliminary Report of the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
United States Senate, on Investigation of Railroads, Holding Companies, and Affiliated
Companies) SEN. REP. No. 25, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) Pt. 3.
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causes of action. The reaction of the profession toward these developments
is natural and understandable, but, in this writer's opinion, short-sighted. ;Xc..
countants would pay too high a price for obtaining irresponsibility by uncon-
trolled flexibility. Because of the very conventionality of accounting, ac-
countants must, to the maximum extent, work according to fixed rules and
should welcome governmental standardization of their measures. If accotuntants
insist on being artists, their function in providing tools for financial judgment
may well descend to the same unimportant and decorative level as that of the
man who plans the format for the annual report or prospectus.
HOMER KRIPKE t
MOBILIZING FOR ABUNDANCE. By Robert R. Nathan. New York: Whittlesey
House, 1944. Pp. XIII, 228. $2.00.
POSTWAR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. Edited by Seymour E. Harris. New York:
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1943. Pp. XII, 417. $3.50.
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY. By Joseph A. Schumpeter. New
York: Harper & Brothers, .1942. Pp. X, 381. $3.50.
11TIERE'S THE MONEY COMING FROM? By Stuart Chase. New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1943. Pp. IX, 179. $1.00.
IT is surely symptomatic of this age of troubled transition that a large por-
tion of the American population believes that when peace comes, it will be
accompanied by a resumption of large scale under-employment of men and
equipment. The invalidity of this unwonted pessimism is perhaps indicated by
the fact that most professional practitioners of the allegedly "dismal art of
economics" do not share the public's trepidation. The twenty-six authors of
the four books on postwar problems under review here differ in their diagnoses
and prescriptions: they concur, however, in their prognoses as to the possi-
bility of continuing to maintain high income and employment levels after the
war. Aside from their basic optimism, the authors are in agreement only in
the general utilization of the new "income flow" technique for analyzing prob-
lens of business fluctuation.
During the nineteen twenties, students of business fluctuations in the United
States and Great Britain tended to place a major emphasis upon changes in
the r.elationships between costs and prices, or upon malfunctioning of the
banking system, as the crucial factors underlying the transition through the




phases of the cycle.' Some attention was also given to the effect of changes in
the level of consumption on new investment-the so-called "acceleration prin-
ciple." Government was expected to supply an equilibrator, through control
of the money market; changes in the rediscount rate and the quantity of
money available were deemed the major techniques of control.2  During
the nineteen thirties, increasing emphasis was placed on the effect of in-
creases or decreases in total income levels on savings, on the one hand, and
consumption and investment expenditures, on the other. This involved not
only a change in the tools of analysis, but a departure from time-honored
preconceptions of what may be called the received Classical and Neo-Classical
schools. Originally under Say's "law of markets," equating supply and de-
mand,3 an increase in thrift was treated as an unqualified national boom under
any conditions, since savings were deemed to be automatically applied pro-
ductively. The Classicists considered that the capital market was controlled by
the same laws as the market (under conditions of free competition) for physi-
cal commodities; any momentary surplus or deficit of savings would be cor-
rected by the resultant alteration in interest rates." [Later "orthodox" econo-
mists, however, were skeptical as to the definiteness of the correlation between
fluctuations in interest rates and changes in savings and investment.] There had
developed concomitantly the theory that a divergence between the bank rate (the
1. The classic exposition of the thesis that the business cycle is basically a self-gen-
erated reflection of changes in the relations betveen prices and costs, profits and anticipa-
tions, is WEsLY Mrc Eu, BusnIEss CYCLFs (1927) c. 1. See also Artnun An.jass,
ANALYSIS OF BusINEss CYcLEs (1925); PxOu, INDUSTRIAL FLVCaUATIO.NS (1913).
The leading exponent of the purely monetary theory of the cycle was the English economist,
Hawtrey. See GooD AND BAD TRADE (1st ed. 1913); THE- ART oF C=TALz . BAImn;o
John Maurice Clark was responsible in large measure for the early development of the
"acceleration" principle. The most complete statement is in his SnAm'Mc FACyroas I.
BusIN-Ess CYCLEs (1934). The importance of the doctrine has been sharply questioned in
HAANSEi, FIsCAL. POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES (1941) 274-28.
2. In other words, emphasis was placed on the short-term interest rate. See HAnmyi,
CREDIT PoLicias OF THE FEDERAL RrESERV Sys=a. (1932); Hersey, Historical Rcviow
of Objectives of Federal Reserve Policy (1940) 26 FEu. REs. BULL. 279; HAN,=- Com-
IERCE: AND TRADE (1928) ; HANSEN, FIscAL POLICY AND BusiNEss CYC.ES (1941) 65-78.
3. J. B. SAY, TREATS ON POLITICA.L ECONOmy (Princips ed. 1812) 167, 172-10.
This was a useful conceptual device as applied to the condition existing before the spread of
machinery and the development of credit-banking and industrial corporations. See Rogin,
Book Review (1944) 34 Am. EcoN. Rnv. 1124, 1125-6. It retains a limited utility in point-
ing out that payments made in the productive process, considered as a whole, i.e., wages,
interest, profits, are also the major source of demand for the goods created in the same
process.
4. See RlcARO, PRiNCiPLES OF POLITICAL EcNouY (Everymian's ed.) 95, 193; HAw,-
TEMY, CAPITAL AND EMPLOYMENT (1938) 165. The development after the Mid-Nineteenth
Century of the time-preference theory of the rate of interest made application of Say's
law to savings and investment considerably more palatable. In discussing the problem
of changes in the size of working capital accounts, Marshall long ago recognized one
possible leakage-an intuition later exploited by his disciples, Robertson and Keynes. See
ALFRE MARsHALT, Mo.NEY, CREDIT AND CoMan.cE (1923) 45.
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rediscount rate of the Bank of England) and the "natural rate of interest" could
lead to disequilibrium of savings and investment.5 But this perception, rarely
formulated into a coherent theory, while influential on the Continent. seems to
have disappeared from the forefront of Anglo-American theory after 1850.
The technique of analysis developed (partly on the basis of experimental
theories of the 1920's) during the 1930's by Keynes, Robertson and Hansen,
starting with Mitchell's premise that fluctuation rather than equilibrium is the
"normal" state of business, is predicated on a challenge to the assumption that
the savings of the community are offset automatically.0 Attention was con-
centrated on the possibility of an enduring or intermittent condition of large
5. See THORNTON, THE PAPER CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN (Reprint, 1939); T. JoPLN,
VIFvs ON TmE CuaENcY (1828) ; historical discussion in THOMAS WILSON, FLUCTUATIONS
IN INCOME AND EmPLoymENT (1942) 9-17. Irving Fisher continued to discuss diver-
gences between market and natural rates of interest; see FISHER, APPREcIATION AND IN-
TEREsT (1896); TE THEORY OF INTEREST (1930) c. 2; but his cyclical theory placed
unilateral emphasis on the effects of cumulative deflation and debt reduction. See FIsHER,
Booms AND DERESSIONS (1933).
On the Continent, the Swedish economist Wicksell elaborataed Thornton's perception,
See esp. 2 WIcxSELL, LEcruRES ON POLITICAL ECONOxY (1904, Eng. Ed. 1934). A school of
Viennese and London economists developed a monetary over-investment cycle theory,
starting with Wicksellian touls, leading to policy recommendations directly contrary to
those of the Keynes schools. See HAYEx, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (1931), RoInINS, Tim
GRE.AT DEPREsSION (1934). For analysis of the fantastic assumptions on which the Hayek
theory is built, see HABERLER, PROSPERITY AND DEPREssioN (1939 ed.) 53-57; Hansen &
Tout, Saving and Investment i Business Cycle Theory (1933) 1 Econometrica,
6. See J. M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONLY
(1936); ALviN HANSEN, FuLL REcovERY OR STAGNATION (1938) and FISCAL POLICY AND
BusINEss CYCLES (1941). See also D: H. ROBERTsON'S earlier magistral, BANXING PoLc
AND THE PRICE LEVEL (1925) and KEYNES, TREATISE ON MONEY (1932), For simplified
and shortened versions of the Keynesian analysis, see JOAN ROBINSON, THr. THE RY oF Em-
PLOYMENT (1937); J. E. MEADE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PoLICY (1936) Pt. I.
A needless note of confusion is intruded by Keynes' terminology. For by definition,
he makes savings over every given time period equal to investment. Looking back at a
period, this is invariably true; but, as Hansen has pointed out, this terminology makes it
difficult to deal with the problems of monetary flow over periods of time, such as hoarding
and dishoarding, credit creation and debt creation, which are among the enzymes of dis-
equilibrium. See Hansen, Keynes on Under-employment Equilibriun (1936) 44 J.
PoL. ECoN. 667, 675. Much of this confusion is eliminated by resort to Robertson's defini-
tions, under wlhich savings of any given period are defined as the income of the preceding
period, minus consumption in the given period. Investment is defined as the total of spending
in a given period, minus the total of consumption disbursements. Credit creation or dis-
hoarding may make investment in any period exceed saving; hoarding or debt reduction
may achieve the reverse result. See Robertson, Saving and Hoarding (1933) 3 ECON. J.
55; see also Heilbroner, Saving and Investment: Dynamic Aspects (1944) 32 Am. Ec.
REv. 827; Ohlin, Some Notes on the Stockholm.Theory of Savings and Investment (1937)
47 EcoN. J. 53, 221.
In fact, Keynes' formulation is vitiated by an apparent attempt to preserve the rigor-
ous determinism and internal consistency, which characterized some of Ricardian and Mar-
shallian economics. See Clark, Ecowmic Adjustments after Wars: The Theoretlcal Issues
(1942) 32 Am. EcoN. Supp. 1 et seq. Thus an exaggerated role was assigned to "the
interest rate" as a determinant of investment decisions. For demonstrations of the limited
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scale unemployment; little in the Keynes-Hansen argument was contrar
- 
to the
cost-price and anticipation-investment incentive analysis of the cycle.ca Many
of its more perfervid advocates have exaggerated the newness of the theory.
Thus its basic policy recommendations have a familial relationship to the under-
consumption theories of certain of the mercantilists and of Malthus and Sis-
mondi. The analysis of savings partially in terms of community habits had been
inaugurated by Keynes' great preceptor, Alfred Marshall, in the late 19th
Century, and was standard equipment for those trained in the "oral Cam-
bridge" tradition.
The key theorems of the new analysis are: (1) that decisions to save and to
invest are not entirely made by the same persons and are in any event motivated
by somewhat different factors; (2) that the "rate of interest" does not func-
tion as a completely pautomatic equilibrator of the demand for and supply of
savings; 7 (3) that in an advanced industrial society, a cyclical increase in
role actually played by interest rates, see Mfeade- & Andrews, Staninary of Replies to
Qitestions on Effect of Interest Rates (1938) OxroRn Ecox. PA,%rs, No. 1; Ebersole,
The Influence of Interest Rates Upon Entreprenurial Decisions in Business (1933) 17 Htax.
Bus. R\v. 35; see also WHITE PAPER ON EMP OYSINT POLICY (C. M. D. 1944) U60; 1
KEYNES, TaxArxsE ON MoNEY (1932) 196 ct seq. However, Keynes clearly posed the key
problem of a highly industrialized, private enterprise economy, i.e., the crucial role of
investment in determining the general level of business activity and the increasing diffi-
culty of finding private investment outlets. The problem thus furmulated has been examined
in detail, with particular reference to recent structural changes in the American economy
in the two works by Hansen listed above. (The historical function of new investment in
stimulating economic growth and also the role of investment fluctuations in the business
cycle had been indicated earlier by other economists. See c.g., DENNis Ronmrsor., BANK-
ING POLICY AND THE PacE LEVEL (1925); J. 'M. CLARK, SmrTmic FAcroUs IN Busi-
iruss CYcLts (1934); ScHumPErna, THE THEORY OF Eco.ostic Dsv LOPUENT (1927);
see also HANSEN, BusilEss CYCLE THEORY (1927) cc. 4, S. But these studies failed to
emphasize the relationship behveen the problem of finding new investment outlets and the
structural changes-which to an as yet undetermined extent are differentiating the economic
world of the 19th from that of the 20th Century.)
Keynes also utilized a static technique of analysis, paying little attention to the effect
of changes over time in anticipations. See HABRLEF, op. cit. supra note 5, at 244-5. Han-
sen's work is less rigid and more sophisticated in this and most other respects.
6a. See HAwsEN, FISCAL PoLc- AND BusrNss CYCLES (19411 c. 1 Bennion, Is
Ummployment Chronic? (1944) 23 HAv. Bus. REv. 115, 121-128. However, Keynes at-
tacked the traditional theory that wage cuts were an effective means for promoting recovery.
Chapter 22 of The Geteral Theory made tentative suggestions for developing a cyclical
theory. Further attempts in this direction have been made by two disciples. See HAwtop,
THE TFaDE CYcLE (1936.) ; Kalecki, A Theory of the Business Cycle (1937 4 Rev. Econ.
Studies, 77 et seq.
7. The assumption of a definite inverse correlation between saving and the rate of
interest had, as indicated above, been questioned by modern "Classical economists" long
before Keynes penned "The General Theory." See, e.g., CAssEL, NATUtn A ,'n NECESSTY
OF INTMR EST (1903); IRVING FisER, THE RATm OF ImTsr (1905). Similarly, Keynes
overestimated the myopia of his predecessors in asserting that they had failed to realize
the role of anticipated profits, i.e., in economic jargon, the "prospective yield of capital,"
in the making of entreprenurial decisions to invest. See -L{xNsE.r, BusmNEss Cycuc TIIEo
(1927) 82-6, 134-5.
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income is accompanied by an increase in the proportion as well as the total
amount of income saved; 8 and (4) that there is no automatic process by
which an increase in savings in one period is fully offset in the subsequent
time period. It follows that an uncompensated diversion from the income flow
of one period, e.g., an increase in individual or corporate hoarding, results in a
diminution in total income in a subsequent period. Accordingly, declines in
national income can be avoided only when offsets, whether domestic invest-
ments or otherwise, grow during booms as rapidly as income and savings.
When insufficient offsets are available, the decline in national income, because
of a reverse "maltiplier" effect, usually exceeds the amount of the initial hoard-
ing. (Nor can "full employment"-the goal of the economic system-be at-
tained merely by increasing production pari passu with increases in the number
of job seekers. For this hypothesis disregards technical advance and the secular
tendency towards rapid increases in labor productivity; 0 accordingly, as a
practical matter, full employment can be maintained only if the rate of in-
crease of production exceeds the rate of growth of the working population.)
8. The statistical literature dealing with the cyclical and secular relations in the
United States between fluctuations in income and changes in the proportion of income saved
is legion. See e.g., Ezekiel, An Annual Estimate of Savings by Individuals (1937) 19
REv. EcoN. STAT. 178; 1 KuzNETs, NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS COMPosITION (1941), esp. :t
270-1, 276-83; HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES (1941) c. 11; NAT. REs.
PLAN. BD., THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1939) 91. The situation in
other countries is dealt with sketchily, in CLARic, THE CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS
(1940).
At this point, a conjuncture exists between the problem of cyclical fluctuations and
the social problem of maldistribution of income and wealth. For obviously, as a general
rule, persons in higher income brackets save larger proportions of their income than those
in lower brackets. For detailed analysis, see NAT. REs. PLAN. BD., CoNsutmnS EXPENDI-
TURES IN THE UNITED STATES (1937). While concentration of wealth resulting in a vast
accumulation of savings is probably an engine of progress in a new state or a capital
starved economy, it may contribute to the severity of cyclical fluctuations in a more mature
state.
'9. A study sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research indicated "a
decline of two-thirds in the number of man-hours employed per unit of goods produced"
in manufacturing, from 1899 to 1939, ignoring the effect of improvements in quality. FAnnI-
CANT, EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING, 1899-1939 (1942) 18. According to another
estimate, the over-all hourly productivity of labor in manufacturing industry in the United
States increased almost 100% between 1920 and 1940. BELL, PaoDUcTVrrY, WAVEs, AND
NATIONAL INCOME (1940). See also 30 TNEC Hearings 17,220-42 (1940) (testimony
of Corrington Gill & David Weintraub). The impact of technological changes on agri-
culture, while slightly less impressive statistically, has, due to the relative inelasticity of
demand for certain staple crops, had even more disruptive effects on social patterns. See
30 TNEC Hearings (1940) 16,922-17,078; BERGER & LANDSBERG, AMERICAN AGRICULTURE,
1899-1939 (1942) 294-5 et seq. While at the peak of the present war production boom,
labor productivity probably declined in many plants, there is reason to, believe that in this
war, as in the last, new machinery and plant arrangements have been devised which will
make possible a great increase in productivity in future years. See e.g., STUART CHASE;
WaE's THE MONEY COMLING FROMt? (1943) 121-2.
REVIEWS
The "income flow" method of analysis summarized above has come to be
accepted by almost all students of business cycles.10 The concord dissolves,
however, at the level of policy recommendation. One group-to which Han-
sen and, presumably Keynes belong-adheres to the so-called "mature econ-
omy" or "stagnation" thesis. It believes that unless the "average" propensity
to save can be reduced by redistribution of income or widespread changes in
spending habits, advanced industrial states will find increasing difficulty in
finding adequate offsets for savings in the existing outlets for private invest-
ment and that there will be a high constant rate of unemployment. As applied
to the United States, this prediction is predicated upon certain changes in the
structure of the economy in the 20th Century, 11 including: (1) the decline in
the rate of population growth and in territorial expansion; (2) the increasing
ability of large corporations to defray the costs of new equipment from their
own reserves, without tapping private savings; and (3) the increase in the
number of "capital saving" inventionsyi"
The Anti-Stagnation School, while not oppusing depression utilization of a
works program, seeks to repudiate the conclusion that the United States will
10. Evidencing their traditional occupational lag, many writers of elementary te.'ct
books have persisted in ignoring the Keynesian method of approach. See, eg., the discus-
sion of business cycles and economic fluctuation in M36rats, ErLaMrTs oF MoDZ- Eco-
xomIcs (2nd ed. 1942); KNIGHT, ECONOMIsC PRINCIPLES AND Pm'cre (2nd ed. 1942).
The result is to condition the great mass of students who take only elementary courses
either to accept theories and policy recommendations discarded by advanced students or to
inoculate them with a thorough contempt for economics as an entirely abstract subject.
11. For supporting data and/or analyses of these factors see, in addition to the works
cited supra note 6; 9 TNEC Hearings (1939) 3536-3538, 3597-3665, 3693-5, 4026-40M;
11 id., 4947-4968, 4977-4980, 5479; NAT. R~s. Piax. BD., TzcNoLkGiscA. Tnnr-.u AND NA-
ToNAL PoLic" (1937) pp. 67-91, 97-388; Hansen, Progress and Declining Population
(1939) 29 Ami. Ecoz-. REv. 1-16; Weintraub, Effect of Current and Prospctive Teclno-
logical Developments Upon Capital Formation (1939) 29 Ax. Eco.z RLy. Suvp. 15-32;
Sweezy, Population Growth and Investment Opportunity (1940) 55 Q. J. Eco. 73;
ALTmAN, TNEC REP., SAVINGS, INvESTMENT AND NATIONAL IN cOME, Monograph 37
(1941) ; MYRDAL, POPULATiON (1940) 150 et seq. In Snyder, Capital Supply and National
WVell-Being (1936) 26 Am,. Ec. Re. 195, evidence is presented to indicate that invested
capital has grown little or no faster than value of output, in a series of major industries,
since 1907. Hansen concludes that the recurrent development of new industries, with large
demands for capital, is essential to avoid stagnation and "under-employment equilibrium.'
FIscAL PoIcY ANqD BUsINESs CYCLES (1941) 354-63. It is important to note that the
Keynes-Hansen theorists do not believe that the era of technological progress has ended;
rather, their view is that technological changes will not come quickly enough or be suffi-
cient to absorb the full volume of savings.
12. Thus, betveen 1929 and 1939, the Celanese Corporation of America increased its
stated "effective productive capacity" 700f %, with only a 137% increase in the value of fixed
assets. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CELANESE CORPORATION Or' AlRICA ron 1940 (1941) 2.
Between 1926 and 1938, the value of fixed assets invested in automobile manufacturing
declined 33%, but output and capacity rose by more than 33%, in terms of a constant price
level. Kreps, Consumption (1941) 30 Am. EcoN. Rev. Surp. 3, 177, 182-3. While these com-
parisons are based on too many assumptions to be quantitatively accurate, they serve to
highlight the problem.
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confront intermittent severe shortages of investment outlets by invocation of
the unquestioned truism that human wants are insatiable and by attributing
the incomplete recovery of the United States during the late thirties to gov-
ernmental and labor policies, which, it is asserted, discouraged private invest-
ment.13
While Postwar Economic Problems is a symposium dealing with a wide
variety of problems, its kernel is a debate between devotees and critics of the
mature economy thesis. Slichter, Simons and, to some extent, Bissell-repre-
senting the moderate caucus of the anti-stagnationists-focus attention upon
factors which are likely to create a high rate of spending immediately after the
war. Thus they emphasize the large amounts saved by persons in moderate in-
come brackets who presumably have high propensities to spend, the backlog of
deferred consumer demand for semi-durable goods, the need for rehabilitation
of the manufacturing and railroad plants, and the huge task of overseas re-
construction. Beyond this short run perspective, Bissell and Slichter stake
their case upon the conviction that removal of the barriers to investment, real
and psychological, allegedly erected by the New Deal, will lead to a resumption
of industrial expansion. To some extent this prediction is justified by refer-
ence to the unquestioned fact that national income increased significantly in
"mature" industrial states such as Sweden and Great Britain after 1932.
Evincing, in their discussion of investment incentives, a capacity for amnesia
which would have delighted Freud, these economists fail to emphasize
that the 1929 -holocaust came at the end of an era mrked by extraordi-
nary governmental responsiveness to the wishes of the business community.
Furthermore, Bissell and Slichter gloss over (1) the pump-priming role
played during the 1920's by the $10,000,000,000 (in large measure debt-
financed) spent by governmental agencies (mainly state and local) on highway
construction and the additional billions spent on other public works 14 and (2)
the extent to which exports were financed by flotation of bond issues, exceed-
ing the capacity of the borrowers to repay and, functionally speaking, con-
stituting a gratuitous transfer of idle funds from American investors to Amer-
ican manufacturers and industrial workers.Y' (The available evidence further
13. For sophisticated criticisms of the mature economy thesis, see Slichter, 7'he Period
1919-1936 in the United States (1937) 19 REv. Ecox. STAT. 1; Slichter, Tile Conditions of
Expansion (1942) 32 Am. EcoN. Rav. 1-21; Ellis, Motetary Policy and Investmenl (1940)
30 Am. EcoN. REv. Surp. 1, 27-38; SLcrH , POsvWAR Booma oR CoLLAPsE (1942); Wil-
liams, Deficit Spending (1941) 30 Amt. EcoN. REv. Supp. 1, 52-66; Hardy, Fiscal Policy
and the National Income (1942) 32 Am. EcoN. REy. 109. Excellent agnostic approaches are
presented in ANGEL, INVESTMENT AND BusINEss CYcLES (1941) ; Kuznets, Book Review,
24 Rav. EcoN. STAT. (1942) 34-5.
14. In fact t6 a considerable degree, federal deficit financing during the early 1930's
merely offset the decline in local and state government deficit spending from the high level
it had attained during the late 1920's. See Gayer, Fiscal Policies (1939) 28 Amr. Ecox. Rnv,
Supp. 90.
15. For an ingenious discussion of "foreign bond issues during the 1920's as a method




raises the possibility that the boom of the 1920's was protracted by a series
of rather novel and non-recurrent offsets to savings. 10 Of course, this type of
argument is somewhat self-defeating as a chart of the future, since it is
possible to find non-recurrent factors at the roots of most prior periods of
great industrial expansion, e.g., the government land grants which helped stb-
sidize railroad building in the 1870's. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether
future demands for capital equipment created by technical progress will pro-
vide sufficient investment outlets to compensate for the decline in the past
automatic need for new houses, utilities, and transportation facilities, resulting
from a greater rate of population growth and territorial expansion. I
The reference to British and Swedish experience also seems to this reviewer
to prove too much. For one tling, it is hard to deny that the degree of govern-
mental or labor "intervention" in the operation of business enterprise in those
countries in pre-war years at least equalled that in the United States. More-
over, if pushed to an extreme, the "intervention" argument becomes a form
of business blackmail to forestall desirable social legislation. More provocative
of thought are the fiscal policies pursued in Sweden and Great Britain. Thus
Sweden attempted to adopt a cyclical budgetary policy-promising deliberate
creation of deficits in periods of depression and the countervailing amassing
of surpluses in boom periods. In addition, a capital budget was adopted, where-
by long term government investments were amortized over a period of years
in the manner practiced by private firms, rather than (as in the United States)
added to the total of regular expenditures in the year of outlay.17
In Great Britain, the persistence of high progressive tax policies over the
period from 1910 to date, coupled with an increase in government expenditures
16. This situation is perhaps best approached by e-mmining fluctuations during 1928-
1929. There is reason to believe that this period was marked by a slight decline in the
proportion of distributed national income used for consumption expenditures, together with
a precipitate decline in new residential construction (presumably due to satiation of the
market under existing pricing policies), an abrupt curtailment of foreign lending, and the
gradual exhaustion of possibilities of expanding installment credit. See, variously, WI.soN ,
FLUCTUATIONS IN INCONM AND EXPENDITURE (1942) 143-58; KuzNm's, NATIONAL IN'-
comE AND CAPITAL FORmATION, 1919-1935 (1937) 40; Roos, DYNAMIC EcoNUoxics (1934)
69-110; GINzBmr, THE ILLUsION OF Ecoxom c STABnTY (1938), Apps. A & B; Gayer,
Monetary Policy and Economic Stabilication (1937) 113-131. For an interesting but
grossly over-simplified discussion of the ephemeral nature of certain offsets developed
during the 1920's, see NATHAN, MOBILIZING FOR ABuND.AncE (1944) 80-100. Query,
whether the 1929 holocaust is not equally explicable as (1) the product of a wild
speculative boom, which truncated confidence in securities markets, as (2) augmented by
an unsound banking structure and government inactivity? Even if this hypothesis is
true, a decline in investment outlets may have been responsible for the creeping increase
in unemployment in 1929, prior to the market holocaust.
17. The Swedish (and the analogous Danish) budgetary practices are discussed in the
appendix to LiNDAHr, STUDIES IN; THE THEoRY or MoEYx & CAPITAL. (1939); Wicro:iss,
THAT SwED ISH BuDGET (1939) ; BRiNLEY THomAs, MONErARY POLICY AND Calsis (1935).
See also Musgrave, Budgetary Balance and Capital Balance (1939) 29 Am. Eco,. Rnv. 260.
For more general discussions of recent Swedish economic policies, see CoLE & SnrTH (eds),
DE OCRATIC SwEDEN (1939) ; Testimony of Kreps at 30 TNEC Hearings (1940) 16,262-5.
1944]
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for income-transferring social security and housing projects, resulted in a re-
distribution of income. Thus the British reduced the magnitude of the task
of fihding offsets for savings by reducing the percentage of income saved.18
It is of course impossible to summarize herein the numerous special factors
which contributed to the extraordinary increase of production in England from
1933 to 1939. Most economists attribute a major role to the residential housing
boom-in considerable measure the result of governmental policies, which
reduced the cost of mortgage money and of urban land-and to the temporary
stimulus to new investment resulting from enactment of the protectionist
1931 Tariff Act.' 9
Due to the greater space allotted them in Harris' Anthology, the devotees of
the "mature economy" thesis-mostly disciples of Professor Alvin Hansen-
have been able to make a completer presentation of their case than have their
critics. While the Hansenites concur in the belief that an industrial boom will
probably follow the war, they are skeptical as to its sustaining powers and the
possibility of avoiding heavy long-run unemployment, if the economy is re-
turned to "normalcy." Their reasons for skepticism are spelled out in the
somewhat incomplete and Cassandra-like papers by Samuelson and Sweezy.,"
18. See CLARK, NATIONAL INCOME AND OUTLAY (1938) 185; REPORT OF TnE COM-
mITTEE ON NATIONAL DEBT AND TAXATION (1937) Cmd. 2800, p. 17. In URSULA Hicxs,
THE FINANCE OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT, 1920-1936 (1938) 59, it is estimated that the
sum redistributed from the "well-to-do" to the "lower income" groups by taxation and
social security payments, in a period such as 1935-1936, amounted to a minimum of 110,-
000,000 pds. annually.
While no similar study- has been made for the United States, it is significant that the
tax structure in the United States before the war did not become significantly progressive
until the level where income! exceeded $5,000 per year. TARASOV, WHO DOES PAY TH1E
TAXES? (1942) 4-9. On the other hand, in Great Britain, before the war, the tax
structure was markedly progressive on incomes above 1,000 1 (roughly $4,250). SIIIRRAS &
RosTAs, THE BURDEN or, BRITISH TAXATION (1943) c. 4. In both countries, the tax
structure was regressive in the lowest brackets; more heavily so, however, in the United
States, due to the excessive reliance of state and local governments on sales taxes and
other consumption excises. See Perloff, Fiscal Policy at the State and Local Levels, in
HARRIS (ed.), POSTWAR EcONOMIC PROBLEMS (1943) 221-241; HANSEN & PERLOFF, SrAm1
& LOCAL FINANCE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (1944).
It should be noted, however, that the British national tax structure takes pains to
ensure special treatment for "venture" and new industrial capital, as by providing a 6 year
loss carry-over in the case of new corporations. In fact, in the pre-war period, British
corporation taxation was primarily used as a means of forcing distribution of income to
security holders; heavy reliance was placed on differential taxation of undistributed profits,
At the same time, rentiers were not able to find a Sabine Farm (as in the United States) in
tax-exempt government securities. See Comment, 52 YALE L. J. 400, 406-15 (1943) ; But.
ters, Book Revdew, 56 HARV. L. Rxv. 1344 (1943); HANSEN, FISCAL PoLIcY & BUSINESS
CYCLES (1941) 289-300; 383-399. cf. Bronfenbrenner, Economic Effects of the Taxation of
Government Securities (1940) 35 ILL. L. REv. 295.
19. See STOLPER, FISCAL PoLIcY & THE BRITISH HOUSING BooM (1941) ; Jaszi, The
Budgetary Experience of Great Britain in the Great Depression in FIEDRICH & MASON
(eds.), PUBLIC POLICY (1940) 176-211; HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
(1941) at 96-105.
REVIEWS
Hansen's own provocative essay, "The Postwar Economy" emphasizes two
lines of compensatory government action for avoiding stagnation:
1) The retention of a progressive individual income tax structure and an
increase in public welfare expenditures to shift income from persons with
low, to persons with high propensities to consume; and
2) The devisal of a public works developmental program, emphasizing
urban reconstruction and watershed development. It is contended that if the
Federal government announces its intention of embarking on these policies
on a permanent basis, private investment will be stimulated by the resultant
expectations of greater stability of income.2 ' Far from pessimism, Hansen's
conclusion is that the decline in population growth will lead the way to an
amelioration of living conditions on an unparalleled scale, if the suggested
institutional changes are effectuated.
These lines of policy are explored at length in other papers. The compli-
cated practical problems of planning an extensive public works program are
outlined in an admirable essay by the Canadian economist, Benjamin Higgins.
"City Replanning and Rebuilding" by Guy Greer of Fortune magazine dis-
cusses suggestively a variety of techniques whereby the twin desiderata of in-
creasing the volume of construction activity and redesigning our present dis-
orderly urban conglomerates on a more functional basis may be promoted.
The crucial question as to the volume of public debt which can be carried by the
postwar economy is dealt with in a closely reasoned but almost unreadable
paper by Seymour Harris.
From an economic standpoint, the most serious shortcoming in the presen-
tation of the Hansen school's program is the failure--except in connection with
the housing program 2Z--to discuss adequately alternative methods of stimu-
20. In Samuelson's Paper, Full Employment After the War, HAnnis (ed.), Por-wMAn
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (1943) 27, 47-52, the common argument that this war vill be fol-
lowed by a boom is subject to careful scrutiny. Particularly if price controls are removed
prematurely, it is pointed out, that we are likely to suffer an inflationary boom, which will
be profitable only for restricted groups in the community and probably eventuate in a
drastic deflation, in large part motivated by excessive inventories. See also Samuelson,
Unemployment Ahead (1944) 111 Naw REPuBLIc 344; but cf. SLucnUrm%, PnzsnM;T SAvINGS
& PosrwAR MRm -s (1943).
21. The argument that the failure to embark upon a permanent depression-time deficit-
financed work program reduced their "multiplier" effect had been made in RIcmanD Gurnan=
Lr. AL., AN- EcoNoMIC PROGRAM FOR Aaxzscax Dzasocmac (1938) c. 2. A partial explana-
tion, of course, is that the Administration did not consciously embark on a program of deficit
financing as a means of economic recovery until 1937. See Gayer, Fiscal Polides (1933)
28 Am. Ecow. R.v. SupP. 90-112. The public works program proposed by the President
during the 1938 recession was aborted by the refusal of Congress to pass the necessary
appropriation bills.
22. HARRs (ed.), PosawAR EcoNoMIC PaoDLzr!s (1943) 23-24, 207-19. For a more
extensive discussion of techniques for promoting the volume of private housing activity-
including suburban zoning, simplification of title transfer procedure, authorization of in-
surance company investment in debt-free housing equities, and yield insurance--ee TWnx--
TIETH CENTURY FuND, AxmaIcAx HOUSING (1944) PL 3.
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lating private investment. Without denying the indispensability of deficit
spending in a depression or the general desirability of many features of the
proposed development program, it is nevertheless true as Hansen himself
pointed out in an earlier book that "public policy must in a system of private
enterprise be directed mainly toward providing the necessary considerations
under which private enterprise can go forward." 2 Along these lines, it is un-
fortunate that Postwar Econonidc Problems contains only the most superficial
analysis of the common charge that the present corporate tax structure acts as a
deterrent to new investment and equity financing in general. 24 (It is sur-
prising in this connection that no reference is made to the extent to which re-
duction of corporation tax schedules-unless accompanied by some form of
undistributed profits tax-might augment the savings-investment problem.)
Another gap is the absence of any attempt to deal with the specific problems
of resuscitating and providing long-term financing for small business after
the war.25 Equally surprising is the failure to discuss adequately the extent to
which effective discriminatory antitrust administration could create a new
investment frontier by augmenting consumption, although, as Hansen pointed
out several years ago, this could not provide full employment unless the average
propensity to consume were increased concomittantly. 20
Doubtless it is a tribute to the survival power of the shopworn doctrine that
economic and politics are separate disciplines that the essays by Hansen and
his disciples are strangely oblivious to the structural changes in American
government which adoption of their fiscal policies would probably entail. '7
For example, the present necessity of waiting for Congressional authorization
before a public works program can be initiated or the tax structure modified
23. HANSEN, FIscAL POLICY & BUSINESS CYCLES (1941) 383. In general, this book
and Hansen's earlier FULL EMPLOYMENT OR STAGNATION (1938), although obviously con-
taining few specific references to postwar problems, are much-better rounded introductions
to the long run problems of the American economy than the more recent contributions.
24. For a valuable and persuasive discussion of the general question of incentive taxa-
tion, see Cohm, Full Employment Through Tax Policy? (1940) 7 Soc. RES. 447. See also
Abbott & Zuckert, Venture Capital & Taxation (1940) 55 QUART. J. EcoN. 667 for interest-
ing calculations; HANSEN & PERLOFF, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE IN THE NATIONAL ECON.
omz y (1944) 256-262. GROVES, TAXATION, JoBs, & EMPLOYMENT (1944) contains the best dis-
cussion of post-war reorganization of the corporate tax structure.
25. The most useful discussions are still COVER, TNEC REP., Piolunms oF SMALL
BUSINESS, Monograph No. 17 (1941); FiLENE FOUNDATION, SEMI-FIXED & PERMANENT
CAPITAL FOR SMIL BUSINEsS (1939); BERLE, NEw DIRECTIONS Ix THE NEw WOan
(1940) 110-125. See also OXENFELD?, Naw FIRMS AND FREE ENTERPRISES (1943);
Eccles' proposals, summarized in the N. Y. Times, August 24, p. 24.
26. See Kreps, Conmumption: A Vast Underdeveloped Economic Frontier (1940) 30
Am. EcoN. REv. SuPP. 177-199; Testimony of Lubin & Henderson, 1 TNEC Hearings
1939); HANSEN, FULL RECOVERY OR STAGNATION (1938) 138-141.
27. An honorable and important exception is Perloff's stimulating paper, Fiscal Policy




creates an unfortunate lag between the outset of a decline in business activity
and the commencement of compensatory federal action. It would seem obviou-,
that attention should be given to the possibility of shortening this gap by pre-
paring in advance shelves of public works, which could be commenced upon
the President's initiative, when the business indices indicated a slackening in
the rate of private spending.2 Similarly serious attention should be given to
the devisal of flexible tax legislation, empowering the Treasury Department
to vary tax rates within prearranged limits, in respnnse to changes in the level
of business activity.29
Another group of administrative problems is presented by the public develop-
mental program. Presumably many of the specific projects could be most
effectively administered through governmental corporations, akin to the T. V. A.
But how will the investment decisions of these Authorities be correlated with
the fiscal policies of the Treasury? What methods can be devised to decen-
tralize the administration of the developmental programs, especially in rural
areas, so as to preserve local initiative ? "' To what extent will a large scale
urban redevelopment program require modifications in the existing division of
functions between municipal and county governments ?Postwar Economic Problems also contains a subsidiary debate on the vital
problem of stimulating a resumption of International trade. Here the party
lines are even more sharply drawn. The traditionalists-Ellis and Simons-
reaffirm eloquently the Classical faith that a universal removal of protective
tariffs is the major step necessary for the attainment of "a peaceful orderly
world." This nostalgic conviction that "Nineteenth Century liberalism" pr(-
vides a viable postvar policy is met in the papers by Bryce and Kindleberger.
with a more realistic discussion of the specific problems of printeting monetar%
28. The late lamented National Resources Planning Board was engaged in 1941 and
1942 in preparing a 6-year shelf of important projects to be financed by the federal govern-
ment. The Federal Works Agency has also prepared a shelf from discarded war projects.
Such shelves have been developed to a moderate degree in Sweden. It is important to ac-
company depression works programs with vigorous antitrust activity to forestall pegging
of price levels in the capital goods industries or in the case of closely controlled industrial
commodities, such as copper and lead, at levels disproportionate to those of other com-
modities. See Suc-rzn, TowARDs STABIuTY (1934) 1-34.
29. Thus, contrary to the legislation of the period 1922-1939, it would appear desirable
to raise many rates during a general boom and lower many during a depression. A recent
British Government report recommends decreases in vorkers' and employers' social insurance
contributions as unemployment increases. Consideration of adjustments in the income tax
rates during a depression and of according deferred tax credits is also suggested. Wum&
PAPER oN EMPLOrmExT Pouicy (C.M.D. 6527, 1944) g 68.
30. For suggestions as to some of the problems involved in decentralization of rural
development projects see GAus & WoLcoTr, Punuc ADirx.r]sinuATzox AND TnE DEPAmR-.T
oF AGRicuLTURE (1940) 150-9, 3--6; Comment, 50 Y,%LE L. J. (1941) 10-FG, 1061-1070.
See also NAT. REs. Comm., REGIONAL FAcTs ix N 0x.rox-AL PILAx:xnc (1935) 12-14,
21-23, 34-44, 53-69, 182-191. For tentative suggestions regarding harmonization of the
investment decisions of governmental agencies, see WHim P.%Pm, supra note 29, at 63.
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stabilization and of inaugurating an investment program, to facilitate indus-
trialization of backward areas. Most valuable of all is Kindleberger's institu-
tional description of the deep-rooted factors working to produce disequilibria
in the international balances-e.g., the secular tendency for the terms of trade
to go against raw material countries, and the chronic shortage of dollars.
The Hegelian thesis of Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,
is that capitalism is doomed not because of the insufficiency of investment
opportunities or any functional disorders, but because "its very success under-
mines the social institutions which protect it and inevitably creates conditions
in which it will not be able to live." (p. 61.) More concretely, it is asserted
that the rise of a non-subservient working class, the replacement of bold entre-
preneurs such as the Pacific railroad builders of the Ninteenth Century by
cautious corporate bureaucrats, the increase in governmental "intervention,"
and the growth of. an atmosphere 6f hostility towards "big business" are
slowly draining the vitality of private enterprise. Having delivered this re-
luctant obituary, Schumpeter proceeds to design a bluep int for the peaceful
achievement of what may be termed a Managerial Socialist State. He con-
cludes with a long and pessimistic discussion of the compatability of socialism
and democracy.
It is impossible within the bounds of a printable review to give any adequate
impression of the wide variety of problems or the mass of economic, political,
and psychological theories touched upon in Schumpeter's kaleidoscopic pages.
Perhaps his book is best described as a series of sniping expeditions. At times
the forays are brilliant and provocative, as in the discussion of the role of
political parties and leaders in a democratic state (pp. 250-280) or in the
extraordinarily fairminded analysis of Marxian economics (pp. 9-44). Al-
most as often his arguments read as if they were footnotes appended to a
Liberty League report (e.g., pp. 121-130).
Eschewing the luxury of theoretical combat, it is advantageous to turn
directly to the point at which Schumpeter most vigorously challenges contem-
porary American liberalism-his broadside defense of monopolistic policies.
Proceeding in a strain redolent of late Nineteenth Century Social DarWinism,
Schumpeter defines the operation of capitalist lusiness enterprise as a con-
tinual process of "creative destruction," in which curtailments of output or
pegged prices are the progenitors of progress. Competitive industry is equated
with technological inefficiency. "What we have got to accept is that it (large
scale enterprise) has come to be the most powerful engine.., of the long-run
expansion of output not only in spite of, but to a considerable extent, through
this strategy which looks so restrictive when viewed in the individual case
and from the individual point of time." 31 (p. 106.)
31. In terms of the dialectical philosophy espoused by Schumpeter, this analysis might
be characterized as "the negation of negations." Whereas one or two monopolistic prac-
tices presumably constitute a harmful restraint of trade, a multiplication of restrictions
results in industrial freedom.
a,
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As is the case throughout his book, Schumpeter rides his thesis to death by
the elephantine employment of reductio ad absurdum arguments. In so far
as he is concerned with the (perhaps non-existent) academicians--who seek
by assiduous comparison of the geometric cost curves of firms under idealized
conditions of "pure" and "imperfect" competition to demonstrate that large
scale enterprise always results in higher prices-Schumpeter's appeal to history
has obvious relevance. The circumstance that the thcory of monopolistic com-
petition 3 2 has been developed primarily in the past 15 years does not mean
that the condition of monopolistic competition is equally new; in fact, the
available evidence tends to indicate that "sticky" prices were prevalent in the
United States during the 1890's, as well as during the 1920's.33 The "perfect
competition" of the classicists never existed and never could. More important,
too many economists-perhaps fearful of straying beyond the bounds of Neo-
Classical theory-have sought in recent years to stigmatize "monopoly" as tile
"Gentleman crook," solely or primarily responsible for the depressed state of
business activity.3 4
32. See e.g., E. H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY.OF MoxoroLTrsic Couas'lTrOx- (2nd
ed. 1935); JOAN ROBINSON, THE EcoNomics OF IiPERFucr ComPrnTrO. (1933) ; Shove,
The Imperfection of the Market (1933) 43 EcoN. J. 113. Adumbrations of this theory were
presented by ConasroT, RECHERCHEs SUR LES PRINCIPES MATHEMATIQUES DZ LA TrHEO.IE
DES RicHEsszs (1833) c. 7; PARETO, Co-Rns sEcoxonmm POLITIUE (1896) 63 et seq. A
brief but acute summary of the recent theory is contained in Fly, Observatiors on the Anti-
Trust Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions: 1 (1936) 45 YArL. L. J.
1339, 1340-1358. The basic preconceptions of this line of theory have an obviously closer
resemblance to the observed realities of our economic life than the preconceptions of the
theory of free competition, and result in a vastly superior framework for analysis. How-
ever, the theory provides no "open Sesame" in coming to grips with the complex realities
of any given market. See HAmILToN (ed.), PRICE AND PRxcS PoLacxs (1938) 1-21. For an
interesting discussion of the extent to which pricing policies in a particular market departed
from the predictions worked out by a careful economist, on the basis of the Chamberlin-
Robinson approach, see Reynolds, Competition in the Rubber Tire Industry (1933) 23
Am. Ecoxr. REv. 459; for aninvaluable survey of the actual pricing policies of business firms,
see Meade & Hitch, The Pricing Policies of Entrepreneurs, UXFOD EcoNoiUc P, rVzs
No. 2 (1938).
33. F. C. MiLus, RECENT Ecoxomic TENDENCIES IN THE UNITEa ST,-Ms (1934) 105
et seq.; Tucker, The Essential Historical Facts About Sensitihe and Admi:istercd Prices
(1938) 51 THE ANNAI.xsr 195; Humphrey, The Vature and Meaning of Rigid Prices,
1890-1933 (1937) 45 J. POL EcoN. 651; but compare the undocumented argument in W,%A
& MEAxs, THE MODERN EcoNoMrY I- AcTION (1936) 58-9; see also, Wood, Tucher's
"Reasons" for Price Rigidity (1938) 28 Am. Ecox. REv. 663. The statement in the text
relates only to the cyclical and long run behaviour of "prices"; no attempt is made to hazard
a guess as to the correctness of the general view that there has been an increasing concen-
tration of direct and indirect control over productive capacity in the United States. See
A. R. BuRxs, THE DEaNE OF CoirPrrxIoN (1936) 1-40; compare Stevens, Boo!: Re-
view (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1126 et seq.
34. It is interesting that many of the more ardent advocates of the theory that the
increase in monopolistic practices -as in large measure responsible for the extraordinary
severity and protraction of the 1929 holocaust are sharp critics of government "interven-
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However, during the brief period of pre-war Anti-Trust rejuvenation.
there was no disposition on the part of those who labored in Thurman Ar-
nold's vineyard to deny that large scale enterprise has been an indispensable
means of obtaining the benefits of modem productive methods.15 The house
of industry has many rooms, and generalizations as to their occupants are of
little significance.30 But only confusion can ensue from the attempt to pose
a polar antithesis between "trustbusting" and reduction in costs. Manifestly
pulverizing the 15 or so firms now engaged in automobile manufacturing into
500 or more units to obtain a "more competitive" situation would probably
mean higher prices for the consumer. On the other hand, it is probable that
pulverization into 50 units would be economically desirable. Is any economic
gain derived from including Pontiac, Buick, Chevrolet, et al. under one cor-
porate roof ? Nor should the general financial success of giant corporations be
tion," by deficit spending, etc. Compare SImONs, A POSITIVE PROGARM FOR LAISSEz-FAmE
(1934) with *Simons, Hansen on Fiscal Policy (1942) 50 J. PoL. Ecou. 161-197; see
also MOULTON ET AT., CAPITAL EXPANSION, EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
(1940), esp. at 182-93. The most sophisticated analyses of the relationship between
price inflexibility and depressions have been made by economists under the Keynesian
influence. See HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY & BUSINESS CYCLES (1941) 313-38 (emphaslz-
ing the difference between cyclical and secular flexibility) ; 2 MEANS, STRUCrUR OF TUn
AMERICAN ECONOmY (1938) 9-17; Mason, Price Policies & Full Employment in FRiED cI
AND MASON (eds.), PUBLIC POLICY (1940) 25-58. See also HAERLER, PPOSPERITY AND
DEPRESSION (3d ed., 1942) c. 13.
'It is hard'to evaluate the significance of the fact that the great increase in production
and distributed national income in England from 1932 to 1939 took place in the face of a
steady trend towards cartelization and restriction of production in many lines of industry.
See LucAs, INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION (1935) ; Lxwis, PRICE AND PRODUCTION CON-
TROL IN BRITISH INDUSTRY (1936) ; LEVY, RETAIL TRADE ASSoCIATIONS (1944). Due to
the extraordinary dependence of British prosperity on overseas shipments and the lead
stolen by Great Britain in 1931 as a result of its timely departure from the Gold Standard,
the British experience is perhaps too unique to have great exterior predictive value, It
is also probable that British industry-excepting new lines such as chemicals and electrical
equipment-was more competitive prior to 1931 than was the case in most other indus-
trialized countries. Furthermore, one consequence of the relatively high prevalence of
small scale firms in British industry prior to 1931 probably was the perpetuation of out-
moded technology, VEBLEN, IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2nd
ed. 1941), so that the first impact of cartelization was to bring about the introduction of
more efficient machinery, leading, at least temporarily, to an overall increase in investment.
See LUCAS, supra. A recent government report has intimated the desirability of closer
scrutiny over industrial policies, White Paper, supra note 29, 54.
35. See ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940) 116-131; HAMILTON, Tur
PATTERN OF COMPETITION (1941).
36. For a stimulating symposium on the alternatives available in a specific industry,
see Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Interest (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 543; Hamilton,
Coal and the Economny-A Demnur er, 50 id. 595; Rostow, Joinder in Demurrer, 50 id. 613.
The variations in the degree of imperfect competition are discussed in a sophisticated theo-
retical vein in Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition (1940) 30 AM. ECON. REv.
241, with especial emphasis on product substitution and "intra-industry" competition.
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allowed to obscure the fact that on the whole the very largest Plants in any
given manufacturing industry have proven to be less efficient technically, i.e.,
have higher unit production costs at high utilization levels, than medium-sized
units.37
Schumpeter's rhetorical method of presentation and perhaps his conviction
that a Socialist state is inevitable combine to result in complete failure to deal
with many of the key questions as to the role of giant corporations in postwar
America. For example, does not monopolistic enterprise's natural and under-
standable tendency to accumulate undistributed earnings and its tendency to
retard the introduction of new equipment 38 accentuate the problem of finding
offsets for savings? Does not the decline in the rate of population growth
and territorial spread make the freeing of technology from monopolistic chains
increascingly vital to the continued expansion of the economy? 3 Can the
cumbersome techniques of control devised for the technologically compara-
tively stabilized utilities be applied to technologically more fluid industries ? 4
Short of direct government ownership, with its probably invaluable yardstick
effect in certain fields,4 1 does the Democratic State have any viable alterna-
37. See TNEC REP., FED. TaD.E Comm., REL.TIV EFFricaE;c" or LArcr, MEiUm-
SIZED, AND SMALL BusINEss, Monograph No. 13 (1941); U. S. GEoLoICAL Sunv=v,
PRorssIONAL PAPER No. 123 (1931); Thorp, The Role of Management as Innovator
(1941) 49 DuNs REVIEW (Sept.) 5; compare 15 TNEC Hearings (1940) 8236-7 with
Dillard, Big Inch Pipe Lines and the Monopoly Competition in the Petroleum Ir.dstry
(1944) 20 J. LAND P. U. ECON. 109, 121 (petroleum refining). The confusion intruded by
multiplant ownership is indicated in F. T. C., COMPEiVIMON AND PROFITS xN BREAD AN
FLoUR (1928) which, while indicating decreases in unit costs up to a certain point, as in-
dividual plant size increases, fails to show any correlation between total corporate capacity
and lower costs. The best critical study of the relevant literature is NAT. Bun, or Ecor.
RES., COST BEHAVIOUR AND PRICE POLICY (1943) 219-263.
It is highly significant to note that in almost all lines of industry the largest firms are
able to do their financing at the lowest cost. See TRADING & EXCHAzG- DvisioN, SEc. &
ExcH. Comm., COST OF FLOTATION FOR SMALL ISSUES, 1919-1925 AND 1935-33 (himeo-
graphed Report, 1940).
38. See Stem, Retardation of Technology, in NAT4L -.s. PLAiI. BOARD, TncIn 0Lcar-
CAL TENs AND NATIONAL PaORESS (1937) ; Thorp, supra note 37. There is an old, but
interesting, discussion of the United States Steel Corporation's practices in VATK ls,
INDUSTRIAL COMMINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1927) C. 7; the introduction of new equip-
ment in the steel industry during the 1930's, e.g., the continuous rolling mill, seems to have
been pioneered by medium-sized companies, such as the National Steel Corporation.
39. See Abramovitz, Savings and Irestment: Profits v. Prosperity? (1942) 32 Am.
EcoN. REv. Supp. 53; Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Interest (1941) O "Y.'Iu
L. 3. 543, 593; Hildebrand, Monopolivation and the Decline of Ivestmet Opportunity
(1943) 33 Am. EcoN. REv. 591.
40. See testimony of Jerome Frank, 5 TNEC Hearings (1939) 1,954-9, 1,975; Gray,
The Passing of the Pblic Utility Concept (1940) 16 J. L..AND & Pun. Urn.. Ecom . 8.
41. The erstwhile Socialist administration of Vienna found small public plants a useful
device for reducing the costs of building materials and facilitating a large-scale slum
clearance program. See C. 0. HARDY, HOUSING PROG nT OF THE Cn or VIFN.NA (1934)
c. 4.
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tive to discriminatory Anti-Trust Policy? If it encourages or at least does
not combat cartelization (thus repeating the mistake of the Weimar Repub-
lic),42 without insisting on complete and rigorous government control (which,
in turn, may diffuse responsibility to the point where creative leadership is
impossible),43 does not the Democratic State endanger its own future? Fin-
ally, can the Democratic State retain its vitality in the face of the limitations
on social mobility which would presumably be a by-product of tolerated car-
telization? (While this problem arises in any Managerial economy, it pre-
sumably becomes more serious in a business-controlled state, without the
avenues for societal advancement opened up by political parties or ecclesiasti-
cal groups.) 44
One of the less appealing paradoxes of the postwar period is the possibility
that both the New and Old Dealers are correct, i.e., that the economy after
the cessation of the post-war boom will not be able to provide full employ-
ment over long periods of time, without a considerable measure of government
"intervention," but that such compensatory action will in large measure be
nullified by the fear and distrust of the business community. In other words,
our real difficulties may be more a matter of psychology than of economics.
Recognizing the disastrous consequences of a split between advanced pro-
fessional and lay thinking, Stuart Chase's little book, Where's the Money
Coming From? 45 and Robert Nathan's Mobilizing for Abundance are devoted
to the task of popularizing the views of the Hansen-Keynes school. 40
42. For a thought-provoking study of the Weimar Republic's cartel policy, see NEu-
MANN, BEHEMOTH (1942) Pt. 1; see also STOLPER, THE GERMAN ECONOMY, 1870-1940
(1940).
43. Compare Thorp, The Role of Management as Innovator (1941) 49 DuN's REv-w
(Sept.) 5.
44. A provocative discussion of the dangers confronting our society because of the
growing restrictions on upward social mobility, or, in Paretian terminology, the circula-.
tion of the elite, is found in a brief section in BEARD, THE REPUBLIC (1943) 283-4. Critics
of governmental bureaucracy often ignore the emergence of similar red-tape tendencies in
large corporations. See DIMocI & HYDE, TNEC REP., BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN
LARGE CoRPoRATioNs, Monograph No. 13 (1941). The least debatable and in some ways
the most interesting commentary on social control by business groups is the discussion of
the rise and decline of 17th Century Holland, in MIRIAM BEARw, HISTORY OF THE BUSINESS
MAN (1938) c. 17.
45. WHEI'S THE MONEY COMING FROM? is the third in a six volume series prepared
by Chase under the sponsorship of the Twentieth Century Fund. TunF ROAD WE ARE
TRAVELING (1942) is a brief and uneven discussion of recent American economic history.
GOALS FOR AMERIcA (1942), written in the technocratic tradition, describes the productive
capacities and human needs of the United States in an unbelievably clear, hard-hitting
manner.
46. For other recent popular works along the same lines, see HANSEN, AFrE TrE
WAR-FULL EMPLOYMENT (Nat. Res. Plan. Bd., 1942); ZURCHFR & PAGE (eds.), POST-
-wAR GOALS AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (1944); GALLOWAY (ed.), PLANNING FOR
AMERICA (1941) cc. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, .14. Older but still valuable are CROWTHER, ECONOMICS




As an old technocrat, Chase believes that "what is physically possible is
financially possible." The role of finance is merely to make certain by its influ-
ence on the distribution of the national income between different claimants,
that "financial considerations are never an obstacle to programs which are
physically possible." 47 His mission of public enlightenment begins with a sum-
mary and overcursory discussion of modern theories of money and credit
and of the savings-investment problem. There follows an analysis of Amer-
ican experience during the 1920's and 1930's, in terms of the "mature econ-
omy" thesis. The book concludes with an imaginative but somewhat uncritical
discussion of types of compensatory policy which can be invoked when, as he
believes is probable, the immediate postwar boom bums out.
Chase's major concerns are to refute the old homily that the solvency of a
Nation may be gauged by the same methods as the solvency of an individual
and to dispel the bogies of bureaucracy, paternalism, a crushing debt bur-
den, etc., which, more than true fiscal factors, make the economic future un-
certain. To these tasks Chase brings an unparalleled skill at condensation and
clear, vivid narration. Despite the brevity of his treatment (the book contains
only 179 short pages), Chase poses a half dozen questions which are skimmed
over in the section by the Hansenites in Postwar Economic Problens. See,
e.g., the discussions of monopolistic practices, and of state and county plan-
ning, at 151-4, 164-6. His uncritical enthusiasm for the novel, however, some-
times leads him to laud unduly fantastic schemes, such as the administratively
impossible tax on increases in "hoards," proposed by Hazelett, Dahlberg, and
others. 48
In terms of its intended lay audience, the greatest deficiencies in IWhere's the
Mllonwy Coming From are (1) the failure to so much as intimate the existence
of other explanations of business fluctuations or to discuss the significance of
cost-price maladjustments 49 and (2) the tacit assumption that the investment
stagnation of the nineteen thirties will necessarily recur in the forties. Yet
it is probable that after the demobilization period, one pressing problem of the
post-war American economy will be the avoidance of inflation. It is likely to
be some years before the shortage of investment outlets becomes a serious
problem, especially if the high level of individual savings during the war
47. See note 8, supra.
48. See HAzzarr, DYNAMIC CAITALISM (1943); D.AHuua, WN.g- CAPrA.L Goys
ON SmRix (1938). fore feasible is the scheme to finance depressions-without increasing
the Treasury's interest burdens or counteracting the effect of deficit-finance by Tax increases
-through issuance of non-interest bearing certificates to the banks. See VIuon; Tin;
CREAToN OF PURCHASING PoWER (1942).
49. Hansen devoted considerable attention to the role of price and wage rigidities-
and particularly of differential flexibilities-in his earlier writings. But this phase of his
mature and well-rounded thought has not been overly emphasized by his disciples. See
HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BusINESs CYCLES (1941) 313-341; Hansen, Economic
Progress and Declining Poplation Grolh (1939) 29 Am. Econ. RE%. 1, 13-15.
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years by persons in moderate circumstances results in a greater propensity to
buy semi-durables out of future income.50 In a very fundamental sense, this
pi obability provides us with borrowed time in which to learn how to adjust our
economy to conditions where expansion has become less automatic. One trouble
with deficit works spending (or Pierson's alternate scheme for deficit-financed
consumer subsidies) 51 is that, like all palliatives which relieve the patient's
symptoms, they may distract attention from the harder task of curing the dis-
ease. Few economists today would deny that public works are an indispensable
tool in combating a depression, but it would be an unmitigated tragedy if the
breathing spell of the post-war boom years does not witness the introduction
of progressive tax, social security, and anti-trust policies,5 2 which can reduce
the dangers of subsequent over-saving, with relation to available offsets, and
tend to stimulate private investment.
Since Chase, like any economist worth his salt, is frankly concerned with
psychological reactions, it is also amazing that he has avoided coming to grips
with the common business charge that the policies of the Roosevelt adminis-
tration from 1934 to 1939, acted as a deterrent to private investment.6
A reasonable deficit finance program should present no psychological hazard,
once it is realized that inflation is unlikely to occur while there is considerable
unemployment of men and plant. Two useful policies would be to have
the federal and/or state governments make advance announcements
of their intention to continue concentrating spending in lines, which will not
50. Compare Haberler, Book Review (1944) 34 Am. EcoN. REV. 604; see Livingston,
Wartime Savings and Postwar Markets (Sept. 1943), SURVEY Cura. Bus. 12-18; Welter,
Wartiue Savings Survey and Postwar Inflation (July 1943) id. 13-18. However, it is to be
expected that, as in 1919, fears of over-production, generated by the wartime increase in plant
capacities in certain lines, will make many business men hesitant to build new plants or
add equipment, for some period. See U. S. Dep't of Labor, EcoNoMIcs oF TEE CoNsnTuCrIoN
INDUsTRY (1919) 30; Howenstine, THE ECONOMICS or DEMOBILIZATION (1944) e. 15.
51. PIERSON, FuLL EMPLOYMENT (1940); Pierson, The Underwriting of Aggregate
Connoner Spending as a Pillar of Full-Employment Policy (1944) 34 Am. EcoN. REv. 21;
see criticism in Sweezy, Book Review (1944) 34 Am. EcoN. REV. 134.
52. The Brooldngs Economists have been among the most consistent proponents of
the thesis that low industrial price policies in response to technological changes would
tend to increase national income. See H. G. MOULTON, INCOME AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS
(1935); EDWIN NouRsE, PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY (1944); NOURS. & DRury,
INDUSTRIAL PRICE POLICIES AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1938). But insofar as it aug-
ments sales volumes and leads to higher corporate profits or higher national income the
suggested policy perversely may enhance the savings-investment problem. For savings are
in large measure a direct function of income variations; but investments (considered cx
ante) are functions not only of anticipated profits (which presumably correlate fairly
closely with expected income trends) but also of the rate of technical progress, the develop-
ment of new commodities, the rate of population growth, and. the interest rate. Since the
Brooklngs scholars reject the Keynes-Hansen analysis, they are spared such worries.
53. It is significant that Slichter and Bissell attribute the deterrent effect to tax
or labor policies rather than to deficit spending as such. See HARIs (ed.), PosTwAaI
EcoNoamlc PROBLEMS (1943) 83-113, 248-255.
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compete (except where yardsticks are needed) with probable fields for private
activity, and to utilize subsidies, perhaps analogous to the F. H. A. pro-
gram, to stimulate private investment in socially-desirable enterprises, such
as middle-class housing.54
Chase also, while not reaching the same level of disembodied theoretical word
juggling as Harris and Lerner r deals too lightly with the tax and fiscal prob-
lems which persistent peace time deficits would engender. American experi-
ence in the last ten years has, as he says, demonstrated convincingly that as-
suming we have an income level of $150 billions (at 1943 prices), a national
debt of two to three hundred billion dollars on D-Day need not terrify us. "The
interest burden is not a financial loss to the nation as a whole." 50 However,
in view of the social security, veterans' welfare, and other probable peace time
obligations of the national government, persistent postwar deficits would
make the problems of tax draftsmen in devising legislation which did not
choke off the incentives of private investors most difficult. 7 Furthermore,
unless the economic conceptions of federal, and especially state and local, tax
authorities are drastically changed, a rising public debt may lead to increas-
ingly regressive tax policies, which will nullify the pump-priming -effect of
del'cit spending. The continuous injection of new money into the financial
structure by the sale of bonds to the comnmercial banks, while not having an
inflationary effect so long as a substantial volume of men and equipment remain
unemployed, would also tend to make every period of peak employment one
of potential runaway inflation.us
54. Query, to whata extent the public works program of the Roosevelt adminis-
tartion competed with private enterprise. It is well enough to suggest, as does Bissell
(Harris, supra note 53, at 109-110), that leaf-ralng is wasteful; but it is also productive
of smaller deficits than a works program and has the important advantage, in terms of the
reconversion period, of avoiding competition for perhaps scarce capital equipment and of
minimizing the freezing of labor in postwar ghost towns.
55. See Harris, Postwar Public Debt in H.AIs (ed.), PoSTWAR Ecoo,.Uc PnRoULsS
(1943) 169, 177-87; Lerner, Functional Finance and the Federal Debt (1943), 10 Soc.
REs. 38.
56. p. 106. In 1936-a year of great prosperity in Great Britain-national debt was
224% of national income. TucxER & STEWART, Twasr. Cu.,m FuND, Tnu NArTotAr. Dmr
AND GovERmuIEN CMIT (1937) 8, 99.
57. For careful analyses by Hansenites of the problems which would be created by
continuous deficit financing see DAvm WARIGnT, Tnr CrEATio OF PuRcEIsnG PowzM
(1942) 131-49; Wright, The Ecowinic Limit and Economic Burdets of a n Intrnmally Held
Natio l Debt (1940) 55 Q. J. Eco. 116; Higgins & Musgrave, Deficit Firance-
173-6; see also Shoup, Problems in War Finance (1943) 33 A-r. Econ. Rnv. 74,92-5; Leland,
Management of the Public Debt After The War (1944) Am. Ecox. REv. Surp.- tnx_-
mmNTAL Aspcrcs OF PuBuc FINANco 89-132.
58. See Wright, Moulton's "The New Philosophy of Public Debt" (1943) 33 Am.
Ecoxr. REV. 573; Mitnitzky, Some Monetary Aspects of Government Borroing (1943) 33
A. EcoN. REv. 21, 29-37; Hansen, Progress and Declining Population (193S) 23 Au.
EcoN. REV. 1, 13-15.
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These are criticisms of misplaced emphasis rather than of major policy
suggestions. After all, Chase's book is aimed at the lay public and not at pro-
fessional economists, and over-refinement of analysis would thwart the "wider
public understanding of the opportunities and problems of the postwar period,"
which Where's the Money Coming From ably seeks to promote.
In Mobilizing for Abundance, Robert Nathan traverses much the same ter-
rain as does Chase in Where's the Money Coming Fromt Paradoxically,
Nathan, who is a gifted professional economist, appears to have a narrower
conception of the lay public's tolerance for economic theorizing than does
his competing popularizer. While his point to point analyses are usually more
carefully worked out, Nathan's book suffers from excess repetition and a
failure to concretize arguments with specific examples. Considered as a guide
for the bedeviled, perhaps the chief deficiency of Mobili.ing for Abundance
is the failure to provide a general description of the circular flow of income
in otr economy and of the interaction between payments for participation in
the productive process and purchasing power."
However, Nathan makes two extremely valuable contributions to popular
thinking. In the first place, he attempts to apply the Hansenite analysis to the
1922-29 period, managing magnificently to avoid discussion of the effects of
speculation and credit structure weaknesses. (pp. 35-79.) However, as he
makes no attempt to indicate in any detail the structural 4hanges in the
American economy which have taken place during the Twentieth Century,
an alert but technically illiterate reader could logically conclude that only
Divine intercession or a series of beneficient fortuities averted continuous
catastrophe in prior years.
On a more sophisticated level, Nathan goes beyond the usual plea for deficit
f;nancing to discuss correlative procedures for combatting over-saving. Thus
he emphasizes the necessity for amending the social security tax structure-
which, as now constituted, facilitates government spending (through bond
purchases by the Social Security Board) at the expense, in large measure, of
direct consumption expenditures by persons in the low and middle income
brackets and which, in a boom period, would have an uncompensated defla-
tionary effect. 0 Much more explicitly than Chase, he indicates the extent to
which redesigning of the tax structure-to eliminate its regressivity in the
lower brackets and effectuate progressivity in the middle and upper income
brackets, if accompanied by an expanded welfare program-would decrease
the frequency of the need for deficit spending by decreasing the proportion of
distributed income which is saved. In connection with the problem of incen-
tive taxation, Nathan points out the correlative desirability of heavy taxa-
tion of undistributed corporate profits. 0 '
59. Chase's illustrative chapter, "The Potato Economy," is a masterpiece of simplified
expositive narration.
60. See also PROC. OF NATIONAL TAx Assoc. (1937) 57 et seq.; HAMsEN, FiscA
POLICY AxD BvsiEss CYCLES (1941) 440-3; Burns, Social Insurance in Evolution (1944)
34 Am. EcoN. REV. Supp. 199, 206-10.
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As a complementary instrument of government policy, emphasis is placed
on the need for developing an overseas frontier for investment, which will
absorb considerably more than the net $1,000,000,000 of exports sent abroad
on the average, during the 1920's. While the industrialization of backward
areas is indicated as the method for developing markets able to purchase and
eventually defray the costs of such huge export surpluses, there is unfortu-
nately no attempt to indicate the means of financing, necessarily governmental
in some measure, which will sustain the exports until the process of indus-
trialization is completed. Nor is there any evaluation of the possibility that
despite war-created sterling and dollar balances presently backward areas-
such as South America, China, Africa, and the Near East-unlike the back-
ward areas of past eras-the United States, Germany, Belgium, Czechoslovakia,
Canada-will not possess the exportable natural resources or be able to develop
exportable manufactured goods, sufficient in value to pay for their own indus-
trialization.6 2
Mobilizing for Abundance treats goverunent deficit spending as "the ace
in the hole" (p. 189) to be resorted to only when other techniques for equat-
ing savings and offsets to savings prove insufficient. Despite this somewhat
coy formulation, it is clear that Nathan believes intermittent deficit spending
will probably becomiie a regular feature of our economy. This emerges most
clearly in his attempted refutation of the case for cyclical budget balancing.
"The combination of government spending for pump-priming purposes and a
balanced budget over the duration of each business cycle will not lift this
average (of income). It will merely serve to cut down the peaks of pros-
perity and fill in some of the troughs of depressions. It will not lift the level
of total production and total employment over the entire cycle. This all as-
sumes, of course, that there is no change in the pattern of income distribution
or in savings habits. If we do nothing about increasing expenditures and de-
creasing savings to the level where private investments or offsets to savings
can absorb all of the savings, then contintous large-scale government spending
is the only way to assure full employment." (p. 192.) Indeed, perhaps the
most original and challenging section of Mobilizing for Abundance is the
sketchy discussion of the difficulties of reducing national debt during boom
periods. (pp. 201-3.)
61. Apparently the Treasury Department's experts are now ready to recommend dis-
card of the excess profits tax at the end of the war or the reconversion period, but have
not yet committed themselves to revival of an undistributed profits tax. For provocative
discussion of the- forms such a tax might take, with emphasis on the need for according
special treatment to personal holding companies, chronic accumulators of e.xcess surpluses,
and new small enterprises, see GRovEs, PROnuciox, JOBS, AN TAxEs (1944) 29-49. Dif-
ferential treatment for new enterprises is particularly important to permit the grovth of
such firms to effective competitive size. See BELEu, MEMOANDMI 0. MoxoroLr To TTu:
TNEC. (1939).
62. See, generally, Buchanan, Intcrnzational Investment : Some Post-War Proble and
Issues (1944) 10 CAN. J. Ecox. & POL. ScIEcE 139; STALEY, WoN.n EcoN;oMc D=vZWr-
ms:EN (1944).
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Like the Brookings scholars (see Nourse, Incomc and Economic Progress
(1936), Nathan believes that increases in wage rates are a clumsy method for
redistributing income. (p. 86.) While this argument is theoretically unassail-
able, and without denying that excess wage increases may protract a period
of investment stagnation, one is led to wonder whether. if during another "pros-
perous" era the national administration adopts conventional economic and fiscal
policies, while the labor movement retains much of its present strength, selective
increases in wage rates may not be a useful technique for postponing the advent
of depression. Of course, the utility of wage increases would depend upon the
extent to which we.could repeat the experience of the early defense economy and
of the 1920's and keep prices from rising pari passit with wages, with industry
finding a cushion to absorb increases, in the lower unit overhead costs result-
ing from fuller plant utilization. 3 A moderately increasing wage level might
also be a rough but workable method for unfreezing technology and accelerat-
ing the introduction of new machinery. It is hardly necessary to add that the
success of such a program would be dependent upon careful co6peration be-
tween trade union leaders and progressive economists and that, in any event,
it would confer relatively little benef~t upon large unorganized segments of
the population-white collar workers, farm laborers, small businessmen, etc.
Progressive taxation and an expanded welfare program may be both easier
of administration and more equitable, but will they be probable political poli-
cies?
Perhaps the greatest over-all contribution of Chase and Nathan to popular
thinking is in refuting the prevalent conception that national income is a fixed
fund, which induces many conservatives to assume that progressive tax poli-
cies or an augmentation of social security payments necessarily would mean
a decline in their own welfare. In Nathan's words: "Fundamentally, it
doesn't mean a redistribution of a given total income, whereby the more pros-
perous yield part of their income to the less prosperous. Rather, flowing more
income into the poorer classes will result in a higher total inconw, to the end
that even the more prosperous among us will have more, rather than less, in-
come. If through a moderate redistribution of income we could reach and
maintain a much higher total production, all classes of society would benefit....
Higher consumption is the real solution ... the more we consume, the more
will we produce." (pp. 134-5.) 64
AsniER LANS't
63. See Lubin, Wage Policies and Price Trends (1942) 31 SuRvzY Gainic 19;
Wolman, Labor in 2 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES (1929) 425. For a provocative and op-
positely phrased discussion of past wage policies see Slichter, Problems of Wage Policy
After the War (1944)'21 PRoc. Ac. PoL SCIENCE 64. See also Haberler, op. cit supra note
5, at 372-3; Mitchell, Bitness Cycles in EDIE (Ed.), BusINESS CYCLES AND UNMtPLOY-
MENT (1923) 1, 10-11.
64. See also CHASE, WHERE'S THE MONEY COMING FR oM? (1943) 174-6.
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